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INTRODUCTION

The thesis of this paper is neither new, nor subtle. It has, in fact, been a
recurrent theme in many writings concerned with the interests in copyright1 and
their effects in the present world.
When I first started to- think about this paper I imagined an incendiary
introduction: "Whereas the author's interests were originally the focus of both
the Copyright2 and the Authorship systems3 , this is no longer true. Both
systems promote

other~

quite different, even opposite, interests." I abandoned

this introductory passage discovering that the author's interests have never been

1

I use the term "copyright" in its broadest sense, or in other words, to designate the legal
protection of non-functional ideas expressed in a tangible form. Here, it is virtually synonymous
with "literary and artistic property".
•

2

. In this case I use Copyright" as a generic term for any kind of literary property protection
in countries of common law origin (by common law or statute), as opposed to the protection
conferred by the civil law system. For an overview of the differences between these two major
legal systems, see A. T. von Mahren, and J. R. Gordley, "The Civil Law System. An
Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law" Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1957; A. T. von
Mehren, "Law in the United States", Kluver, Boston, 1989.
3

I use the expression "Authorship protection", as synonymous with "author's rights
system", and as a generic appellation of literary property protection conferred by the civil law
system, and opposed to that of the common law system. See supra note no. 2.
•

8
the focus of copyright4 (or at least the real interest of such laws). On the other
hand, authors have never obtained such great benefit from their intellectual
productions as today. (Though this is reliably the case only in societies where
there is a productive industry producing intellectual goods, and a large number
of consumers of intellectual production5 .)
Aside from such speculations over the focus of copyright statutes6, my
concern is also with the perversion of domestic copyright provisions from an
incentive for learning and progress7--within whatever limits that goal was fairly
found in statute and case decisions--into an insurmountable international obstacle
to learning and education. The position taken by GA'IT8 in its TRIPs

4

•

See supra note no. 1.

5

• About the relationship between the consumers, their degree of literacy, and the real
possibility of different financial rewards for authors, see M. J. Holland, "A Brief History of
American Copyright Law", Copyright Dilemma, (ed. H. S. White), American Library
Association, Chicago, 1978, at 3.

6
7

•

See note no. l.

•

See, i.e. the English and American copyright systems where the ultimate goal is expressly

stated.
8

Within GATT the partners were the winners of a world war (1947). They decided to
rationalize their international economic interdependencies, at an institutional level. (GATT,
1947, for some purists, but not for Keneth Dam, was not an International Organization. "The
GATI. Law and International F.conomic Organization", Chicago UP, Chicago, 1970, at 335.)
•
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exemplifies why the use of intellectual works, even if technically free for
educational purposes9 become in fact unavailable for developing countries10 ,

Initially they seemed oblivious of the very existence of their "less-developed partners n.
This is partly true and understandable because some of the present developing countries were
covered by colonial "representation". They were either the United Kingdom (Annex A), or the
United States of America (Annex D), or incorporated in the French Union (Annex B), or in the
Customs Union of Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands (Annex C). Dam, The GATI,
448-9. And partly because the remaining part of the current "less-developed" countries, were
simply not yet members.
Of the former socialist countries, the former republic of Czechoslovakia "was a
contracting party before it adopted socialist institutions", and Poland, since 1967, "has
participated in the work of the GATI under special and highly limited arrangements." Hungary
and Romania were accorded "only observer status," and the remaining East European countries
(Bulgaria, Albania and the former countries included in the Soviet Union), excepting the former
Yugoslavia, had no relations at all with the GATI. The best position was probably occupied by
the former Yugoslavia, which was regarded as a possible future partner with a market economy.
Dam, The GATI, 317.
9•

The Berne Convention, the Paris Act (1971) ensures free access to foreign educational
sources under certain conditions. For the text of this amendment, V. Porter, "Beyond the Berne
·Convention: Copyright, Broadcasting and the Single Market," John Libbey, London, 1991, 1018 [hereinafter Porter, Beyond the Berne Convention].
About the goal, from a publisher's perspective, of educational achievement in relation
to the economic level in developing countries, such as India, D. N. Malhorta, "The Publishing
and Copyright Situation in India," Copyright. Economic and Cultural Challenge, (Publishers'
International Union 2d Symposium, April 1990) LITEC Paris, 1990, 143-7.
On the younger component of the population which interests the World Bank as an
important potential market (more than one out of two children worldwide does not own a
textbook), B. Salome, "World Bank Activity in Support of Publishing in the Developing
Countries, " id., at 164.
About the functions of the UNFSCO's International Copyright Information Center, which
primarily assists users in the developing countries to secure copyright clearance on favorable
terms, especially in the case of educational works, J .Phillips, R. Durie, and I. Karet, "Whale
on Copyright," Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1993, at 154 [hereinafter Whale on Copyright].
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when practical access to them becomes subject to limited or even monopolized
technological means, such as data bases. Consequently, Copyright11 and so
called author's rights 12 have become another powerful instrument to control and
dominate this world of sound and fury.
This paper is structured in three parts. The first (Book I) addresses the
original interests of copyright and the insinuated mutual international interactions
between different national copyright regimes. It attempts to reveal the
commercial essence of copyright13 generated by its educational (in the nonideological sense) and censorial side14 • The second part (Book m is focused on
Among many other tasks, ~CO uses data bases in developing countries to keep
abreast of domestic copyright developments as well as about international treaties. See, A.
Garz6n, "UNESCO and Copyright in the Developing Countries", id., 170-3.
10
•

11

12

13

14

•

See, supra note no. 2.

•

See supra note -no. 3.

•

See supra note no. 1

A premise of this paper is that the commercial exploitation of any copyrighted work is
the plain evidence of its social importance. And, as I will try to explain, this social value is
conferred either by the work's informational content ("informational" in its broadest sense)-when the public has an interest in it-, or by the "secondary meaning" of that content--when,
originally the lay, and/or religious authority, and later the owner of the copyright in that, work
(distinct from its author), qeveloped an interest in it. For a correlation between the "social
value" and "social importance" of a book, and its "commercial exploitation", see Justice
Brennan's opinion in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413; 86 S. Ct. 975; 16 L. Ed. 2d 1; 1 Media
L. Rep. 1390 (1966).
•
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the 20th century moment in the evolution of national and regional or
multinational statutes focused on literary and artistic works. The commercial
focus--even obsession- found in the copyright regimes of the United States and
the European Economic Community and its meJllbers, presented from the same
previous perspective, is exemplified by the policies governing musical
compositions created by members of collective societies. The third part (Book
Ill) addresses the same issues from an even larger international perspective than

the European Community and the United States, discussing the impact of
copyright15 upon the developing countries and the growing role of plainly
commercial international institutions such as GATf in this domain.

In this paper I totally disagree with both express theories of the Copyright and Authorship
systems' goals: In the first, the dissemination of information for the public welfare though
private incentives, as the expressed legislative purpose, and in the second, the protection of the
author as an author.

Explained in a few words, I disagree because, in the first, as I try to demonstrate, a
copyright statute--in any common law country--, represents a purely commercial public policy,
because of the special "social value" of the traded goods, and, concerning the second, essentially
a truism-belonging to civil law systems--, an author, in order to be protected as an author, has
to have authored something, and that something will define his legal position, which
consequentially will delimit her protection. Thus, in civil law countries as well though, the
author is promoted as the central figure, what really interests national legislation is the eventual
copyrighted goods, and their commercial distribution.
15

•

See, note no. 1.
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Unfortunately, this paper fails to reach either a radical or an optimistic
conclusion. This is the result of two prudent observations. First, due to the
specifics of the exploitation of literary and artistic productions, authors have
never succeeded without an "exploiter"16 • It appears they must accept in one
way or in another, their own spoliation--directly by an investor, or indirectly by
authors' guilds 17 • Secondly, at the international level the transfer of information
and technology has always been unidirectional (from developed to less developed
peoples), and thus, present circumstances are hardly new. Consequently, this
paper has only a very constrained, if any, importance; it marks what may well
be a new style in legal writing--the "open paper"-, a counterpart to Umberto
Eco's open novels. 18

16

Since the invention of the movable type printing press the author-writer has remained
dependent on her publishers. On the origin of this reciprocal servitude, see A. R. Bertrand, "Le
droit d'auteur et les droits voisins, • Masson, Paris, 1991, at 24 [hereinafter Bertrand, Le droit
d'auteur].
17
18

•

•

Usually they are called collective societies.

See for a theoretical approach of "open works", e.g., U. Eco "Opera aperta: forma e
indeterminazione nelle poetiche contemporane" Milano: Bompiani, 1976.
•
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BOOK I. GENESIS

A. AS A COMMERCIAL REGULATION

When Medieval Europe19 reached the sustainable level of a commercial
exchange economy, the division of labor and its specialization and
professionalisation increased sequentially, because communities produced more
than they needed themselves, the trade had developed20 • By the latter part of
the 13th century, this phenomenon generated a peculiar appreciation of cultural
productions, even if restricted to a small elite2 1• Cultural and economic value
started to merge. (As an example, books became worthy as something more than
mere manuscripts, because of their rarity, and therefore became "such valuable

19

For the basic historical information discuss in this paper, see H. G. Koenigsberger, &
A. Briggs, •A History of Europe", t.I. Koenigsberger "Medieval Europe 400-1500", and t.ll.
Koenigsberger, "Early Modem Europe 1500-1789" Longman Inc., New York, 1991 [hereinafter
Koenigsberger, t.1 and Koenigsberger, t.11].
•

20

• On the beginning of trading in urban areas governed by professional corporations or
guilds, see Koenigsberger, t.I. 144-7.
·

21

• Usually only monks and clerks could then read and write. For example, Magna Carta,
signed in 1215, was signed with signet rings, because the greater part of nobles couldn't write.
On the social scale of that time, "Men of letters"--the literate--were inferior to "Men at Arms".
SeeR. W. Jones, "Copyright and Trade-Marks". E.W. Stephens Co., Columbia Missouri, 1949,
at 9 [hereinafter Jones, Copyright]. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume that the number
of books was not too important, and the literate 'elite' was really very restricted.
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articles of property that they were often pledged as securing for loans. "22)
Later23, efforts to develop mechanical inventions grew24 • Cities
developed a new social and psychological environment25 where people invested
both in business ventures and in the patronage of artists, thus encouraging a
great flowering of creative activities26• Education and literacy spread to the lay
urban public and provided the market·for the enormously increasing output of
the printing press. Thus, a new form of industry and trade appeared: the book
trade27 •

22

In Paris a public scandal was caused by exorbitant prices demanded for books by
booksellers--also called stationarii--, and bookbrokers--also known as librarii. See H. G. Ball,
"The Law of Copyright and Literary Property", Banks and Co., Albany, Mathew Bender, NY,
1944 at 8 [hereinafter Ball, The Law of Copyright].
23

24

•

•

Koenigsberger, t.1. 343-364.

•

An example of a mechanical invention from those days is the movable type printing

•

Koenigsberger, t.I at 364.

press.
25
26

• It was in the Italian cities where the artists first became conscious of their potential social
role. Leonardo, when he portrayed himself as a wise old man with a beard, imitated "the
traditional representation of God the Father". Durer might have thought of his role as creator
"after the Creators", when he portrayed himself suggesting the image "which was usually given
to Jesus Christ". Koenigsberger t.I, 374-5.

n. Koenigsberger, t.11at155. By the time printing was invented in Europe, both stationarii
and librarii were carrying on their trade in most of the European cities. See S. C. Masterson,
"Copyright--History and Development", 28 Calif. L. Rev. 620, cited in Ball, The Law of
Copyright at 9. On the connection between the printing press and the industry of printing and
selling books, see also, A. C. Yen, "Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and
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From its beginning, this trade was no different than any other. As for any
other trade it needed special guild protection against competitors. It was
conscious perhaps, of the potentially free marketability of books at any place and
time28 ,

theoretically by

almost

anybody,

without

requiring

a

hard

apprenticeship. Therefore, different categories of professionals involved in the
book industry and the book trade asked authorities for so-called "exceptions,"
or "book-privileges" to protect them from competition in new printed books29 •
These privileges were first enforced in the ltalian30 and German cities,
Possession", in Ohio S. L. J., 523-5 (1990) [hereinafter Yen, Restoring the Natural Law].
28

• "Books were the first commodity that was mass-produced", and booksellers saw that
profits would be greater if the exclusive right to make copies could be secured. Koenigsberger
also noticed that the later European industrial revolution was inconceivable without this
preliminary industrial-intellectual revolution. On the strict dependence between the books and
printing technology, see. E. Eisenstein, "The Printing Press as an Agent of Change",
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980.

The "copy-right" as the "right to make copies" is underlined in Jones, Copyright, at 69.
On "copyright" as both the practice of securing marketable rights in texts that are treated
as commodities, and as a modern creature of the printing press, see M. Rose, "Authors and
Owners. The Invention of Copyright", Harvard UP, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 1993,
at 3 [hereinafter Rose, Authors and Owners].
29

• For more details, see E. Armstrong, "Before Copyright. The French Book-Privilege
System. 1498-1526" Cambridge UP, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter Armstrong, Before Copyright].

30

• The practice of protecting mechanical inventions through privileges originated in Venice
in the 15th century. One century later it was adopted in other European states. In England these
privileges first appear in 1518. See F. S. Siebert, "Freedom of the Press in England. 1476-1776"
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highly commercialized areas. From a simple commercial monopoly--forbidding
all other printers from the manufacture and sale of printed books31 in a certain
sovereign geographic area-the privilege soon imposed restraints on two levels:
First, the restrictions devolved from restraints applying to all books generally to
specific protections of particular books32 ; and second from protections solely
for the benefit of inventors33 , then expanding for the benefit of publishers34,

Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1952, 33-40.
31

• This commercial monopoly was first established in favor of the inventor or of the first
person who introduced printing into a country or city where it had hitherto not been practiced.
A privilege of this kind was successfully sought by Johann de Spira in September 1469 from the
government of Venice, threatening anyone else who tried to start a press there with fines and
with confiscation of his tools and his books. See, Armstrong, Before Copyright, at 2. Another
example is provided by the Haller's privilege. He originally introduced printing in Cracovia, and
obtained a general commercial privilege in any of the books he printed, id., at 8. In England and
in France, these privileges appeared later, because those governments did not need to offer such
exhaustive privileges in order to induce printers to come and work in their cities, id. at 21.
32

• The earliest book-privilege introduced in a Germany city dates from 1479, Wurzburg,
id., at 3.

33

• For example, Jojann Schoeffer of Mainz, seeking a privilege in 1518 from the Emperor
Maxilnilian I, made the plea, among·others, that his grandfather was the inventor of printing.
On this ground he obtained the grant, id. at 1.
34

In France, for example, by the early sixteenth century, a very large number of firms were
making their living out of the manufacture or sale of printed books. Therefore, a highly
competitive situation developed especially in the protection of copies. In this context, by 1507,
a leading Paris publisher secured a three-year grant for any book for which he should be the first
person to publish it. Id. 21-2.
•

an eco-esc pendulum of copyright

17
· and finally for authors35 • This eventual variety of· recipients of similar
privileges suggests that "making books" was regarded as a unitary industrial
activity. Even if they occupied different professions, each of them were entitled
to protection36 on roughly equal grounds37 •
Therefore, both future different modem systems of protecting literary and
artistic works38 evolved from a pure commercial book-monopoly. Perhaps it

35

Undoubtedly, authors could become professionals, and ask for a professional privilege,
only when a certain level of production and consumption of printed materials was attained.
However, even before that, authors might have obtained a commercial privilege. "The first
author's privilege was one granted in Venice, in 1486. • According to the grant, the author could
choose which printer would publish his book, and any other printer who published it would be
fined 500 ducats. For more details, see Rose, Authors and Owners, at 10.
•

36

• Certainly the most powerful members of the book trade were those who secured bookprivileges. In France, for example, with the statute of 1686, printing gained a general privilege
belol].ging only to printers. I use "printer" to translate "libraire"- "term utilise pour designer les
imprimeurs a partir du XVIeme siecle"; it could also be translated as publisher. See Bertrand,
Le droit d'auteur, at 24.

Thus, a contest between those who controlled the trade through the right to print the most
valuable works and those excluded from power became fated. This struggle has continued within
the metaphysical frame of the "copyright" through the succeeding centuries. See, Rose, Authors
and Owners, 9-12 .
.,,. In France, for example, the grant of a privilege was the result of a request directed to
the state, whether to the royal chancery, to the Parliaments, or to officers of the Crown. It was
regarded as a personal favor which cost the Crown nothing to give. Either printers or authors
relied on virtually the same economic arguments in seeking privileges: The author invoked his
labor and expenses, including the cost of printing, if he paid or intended to pay for it. The
publishers put forward economic arguments for what "they had incurred·or planned to incur in
securing and printing a new item." See, Armstrong, Before Copyright, 78-84.
38

•

Within the common-law system and the civil law system. see supra notes nos. 2 -3.
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had aimed to encourage commerce in a new industry without costing its grantors
anything. (Contrary they earned popularity through an act of genuine charitable
humanitarianism.)
However, its grantors' good deed was the result of the professional
subjects' request when they felt the threat of competition. Whoever was involved
in the book industry in a sovereign area sought as broad protection as possible--a
general prohibition against any competitors from practicing the same activity39
in that geographic area.
For example, in early England, the principal publisher was not an
individual, but a corporate entity-the Stationers' Company.40 They sought to
39

Another manner of book trade regulation--developecl in England-was the guild system.
See supra nos. 36-8, and the text accompanying them.
40

•

For a detailed history, see, C. Blagden "The Stationers Company: A mstory, 14031959", Allen & Unwin, London, 1960.
•

The right to print a book was established through entry onto the Stationers' Company's
register. They used the term "<;opy" to designate both the original manuscript and the right to
print forever a particular book. It was the guild that authorized the system and also administered
it: only its members-booksellers and printers-might own the copies. For details, see Rose,
Authors and Owners 12-13.
The stationers' copyright was an ideal instrument of monopoly for its owner. It was
thought by its grantor to ensure a strict control of published material, providing, at the same
time (as will be discussed), "a superior device of Censorship." See, L. R. Patterson & S. W.
Lindberg, "The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users' Rights" at 19, 1991 [hereinafter
Patterson, The Nature of Copyright], L. R. Patterson, "Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary
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protect their industry under the threat of Scottish competitors4 1•
In this stage they first used the term "copy right". It was never used in
the meaning of a common law right, but as a "right" grounded on by-laws of
the company in favor of its members42 , and in this way they tried to use it later
through legislative statutes. Therefore, the history of statutory copyright in

Inquiry into the Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair Competition", in 17 Dayton L. Rev. 385,
389 [hereinafter Patterson, Copyright Overextended].
41

• Until the first quarter of the sixteenth century, a high proportion of the printed books
required in England was imported from abroad. For details, see E. Armstrong, "English
purchases of printed books from the Continent 1465-1526", in English Historical Review, XCIV
(1979), 268-90, cited in Armstrong, Before Copyright, at 21.

The English publishers, who imported their product and faced competition, were the ones
who promoted the future legislation--the Statute of Anne-in order to export their copyright
control to Scotland. See D. Saunders, •Authorship and Copyright," London, 1992, 55-6
[hereinafter Saunders, Authorship].
This, of course, is an early but surely significant example of the use of copyright as a
means of international trade regulation.
42

• In the Company's records the term "copy right" appeared for the first time in 1701, as
a 'right' grounded on by-laws of the company in favor of its members, empowered in this sense
by the Charter of Incorporation granted by Queen Mary in 1557. This Charter allowed the
London printers, bookbinders, and booksellers to form themselves into a recognized guild of
traders. In this regard, see A. Latman, "Latman's the Copyright Law" 6th ed. 1986, 3-4
[hereinafter Latman's Copyright]; M. A. Leaffer, "Understanding Copyright Law" Matthew
Bender, 1989 2-3 [hereinafter Leaffer, Understanding Copyright]; Saunders, Authorship, 47-8.

According to Saunders, the copyright that legislators knew in 1710, despite the fact that
the term is nowhere mentioned inside the statute, was this stationers' copy right, "a device
formed in and by the book trade for the express purpose of protecting individual stationers'
ownership of the right to print copies of works whose titles had been registered with the
Company." Saunders, Authorship, at 48.
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England43 , and 'its practice, which doubtless influenced both the Continent's
laws44 as well as the English Colonies45 , illustrates quite well that
copyright'6, has meant at least historically, a commercial regulation47 •
43

• For details see, B. Kaplan, "An Unhurried View of Copyright", 1967, 3-9 [hereinafter
Kaplan, An Unhurried View]; L. R. Patterson, "Copyright in IDstorical Perspective", 1968, at
27. "If it can be said that 'copyright' existed before 1709, it might best be defined as 'stationer's
copyright' or 'publisher's copyright'." "Copyright. Current Viewpoints on IDstory, Laws,
Legislation" (A. Kent, & H. Laucour, eds), RR Bowker Co., New York, 1972, at 2.

44 •

At least for the reason that it was the first important legal regulation that benefitted
everybody interested in the book trade-governmental authorities, businessmen, and authors--,
France and the future Germany could not have escaped its influence.
45

On the heavy borrowing from England's Statute of Anne by the American Congress, see,
Latman's Copyright, at 6; Leaffer, Understanding Copyright at 4; A. Latman, R. A. Gorman,
and J. C. Ginsburg, "Copyright for the Nineties. Cases and Materials", 3d ed. 1989, at 4. L.
Benjamin, "Tuning Up the Copyright Act: Substantial Similarity and Sound Recording
Protections", in 73 Minn. L. Rev. 1177 (1991); Booi;styn, N. "Copyright Law," LCP BW,
1981, at 4.
•

On the relation between the American constitutional copyright clause-Art. 1, §8-, and
the English common law copyright, see Saunders, Authorship at 152; L. H. Amdur, "Copyright
Law and Practice". Clark Boardman Co., Ltd., New York, 1936, at 1.; Fenning, "The oiigin
of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution", in 17 Geo. L.J. 109 (1929); Howell,
"Howell's Copyright Law", BNA Inc., Washington, D.C. 4th ed., 1962 at 4 [hereinafter,
Howell's Copyright].
On the general influence of the English common law copyright in American courts, see
R. R. Shaw, "Literary Property in the United States", Scarecrow Press.,1950, at 9 [hereinafter
Shaw, Literary Property].
46

47

•

See supra note no. 1.

This is obvious for the book-privileges, considered by Mark Rose the first "genuine
anticipation of copyright." (A different opinion concerning the connection between the two types
of monopolist protection is expressed in Whale on Copyright at 2: "The system of privileges is
not, however, the true ancestor of statutory copyright.• [hereinafter Whale on Copyright]). It
explains the mechanism by which "the rights conferred by copyright" have been used "to restrain
•
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a) A ROYAL COMMERCIAL LAW

The Statute of Anne48- "A Bill for the Encouragement of Learning by
Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors, or Purchasers, of such
Copies, during the Times therein Mentioned"49 --was the final act of
Parliament's resistance to the full force of the booksellers' pleas to restore their
control of the trade50 they had previously enjoyed, and which during the 17th
century suffered a series of setback5 1 • The stationers' arguments that they
trade competition." MacQueen, "Copyright, Competition and Industrial Design". Aberdeen U .P.
1989, at 2 [hereinafter MacQueen, Copyright, Competition].
• Reprinted in H. Ransom, "The First Copyright Statute: An Essay on an Act for the
Encouragement of Leaming, 1710", Austin: U of Texas P, 1956, 109-17.
48

49

• The original title was "A Bill for the Encouragement of Leaming and for Securing the
Property of Copies of Books to the Rightful Owners thereof', Rose, Authors and Owners, 45-6.

so. On the similarity between the interest of publishers in having a monopoly over the
production of books and the interest of medieval guilds in having control over the production
of a new technology, see A. R. Miller, and M. H. Davis, "Intellectual Property. Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyright", West Publishing, 2d ed. 1990, at 280 [hereinafter Miller and
Davis, Intellectual Property].
si. By virtue of the decree which established the Stationer's Company in 1556, all published
works in England had to be entered upon its register and in the name of some member of that
company. In this way, and supported by the Star Chamber, the stationer successfully claimed
the right to print and publish the work for himself, his heirs and assigns forever. See, Howell's
Copyright at 2. Throughout the entire century before to codification, the publishers had the book
trade comfortably to themselves. See P. Jaszi, "Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of "Authorship", Duke L. J. at 468 (1991) [hereinafter, Jaszi, Toward a Theory
of Copyright].
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merely sought to vindicate the interests of the "rightful owner"-the rights of the
author--had an unexpected effect.
Certainly, the booksellers sought to secure their interests, through the new
legal fiction52 of the auhtor's rights instead of the now hopeless traditional
claim of protection of their profession53 • But ironically, Parliament adopted this
strategy as a weapon against stationer's monopoly itselfi4 •
Although labelled "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning," the statute was, "in fact,
promoted primarily by the London-based fraternity of British publishers" (then designated
"stationers" and "booksellers").
52

• The very passage of the Statute of Anne as well as substance has to be related to the
political and cultural conditions, to the evolution of juridical thoughts, favorable to certain
conceptions about ownership and rightful ownership, such as those developed by W. Blackstone,
in his "Commentaries". In this cultural environment, the publishers found it more effective to
use "the author's rights as a blind for their interests", see, Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright,
at 468.

53

Their "initial pleas were for new censorship legislation to protect the government (and
themselves). Only when these pleas failed did they make their plea for a copyright to protect the
author." L. R. Patterson, "Copyright and the 'Exclusive Right' of Authors" 1 Georgia J. of
Intel. Prop. L. (1993) 1, 12.
•

54

• With the expiration of the Licensing Act in 1694, and the invasion of independent printers
into the sacred domain of the Stationer's Company, stationers could have applied to Parliament
for a: law to protect their a.Ileged rights in perpetuity against those pirates. But, the Parliament,
instead of recognizing their perpetua:l rights, proceeded to pass a law limiting the stationers'
exclusive right of publication. .For details, see Drone, "Law of Property in Intellectua:I
Productions", 1879, at 69. Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, at 147.

"Parliament enacted the Statute as a response to the booksellers' undesirable monopoly
in the book selling business." Yen, Restoring the Natural Law, at 526.
"The history of copyright law is largely the story of judicia:I and statutory reactions to
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Therefore, the adoption of this new legal argument-the author's rights to
property in his work5 5--to contemporary and present commentators alike,
expressed nothing more than a compromise between commercial private
demands and a government understanding of the power of the new merchandise.
(Virtually all commentators have since agreed that the new statute was still "in
its practical effect" a protection of "the J;>Ublisher's right to copy. "56)

the resulting monopolistic restraints." Miller and Davis, Intellectual Property, at 280.
However, despite codification, during the greater part of the eighteen century, "the trade of
bookselling and the facilities for printing and binding books were under the control of a small
group of. London booksellers, who pursued a policy of exclusion and exercised a monopoly
which they successfully maintained and profitably exploited until the last quarter of the century."
Ball, The Law of Copyright, 15-6.
55

• "The right brought into statutory existence in 1710 was the perfectly alienable right-it
could be sold and traded--to engage in certain economic exchanges based on the mechanical
duplicates of a work. As a trade regulation statute. the Act of 1710 neither assum¢ nor
required any equivalence between the person of the copyright holder and the moral or aesthetic
personality of the writer; rather, it delineated and attribµted the legal capacity to own copyright
in a manner designed for the regulation of a specific economic activity--the making and trading
in a printed commodity." Saunders, Authorship at 10.
56

• For "some 150 years copyright was quite simply the right to copy and, exceptJor the
implied right to publish, nothing else." Whale on Copyright" at 11.

Kaplan also suggests that publishers rather than authors were the intended beneficiaries
of the Statute of Anne. An Unhurried View of Copyright, 6-9.
Even commentators who emphasize the anti-monopolistic (and anti-censorship) goal of
the statute, agree that it was "in fact a trade regulation -statute." Patterson, Copyright
Overextended at 399.
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b)

A

ROYAL

FAILURE

FLOURISHED

INTO

REVOLUTIONARY DECREES

In the 18th century, the situation under the French ancien regime5 7 , was

similar to the English copyright regime: the author became a nominal partner
within the book trade58 • As in England, the author's right remained just "a
routine instrument of publishers' interests. "59
In the 1770s, France, perhaps under the English challenge was seeking a

general national codification of existing customary laws60 • This desire would
be fulfilled later under revolutionary ideology6 1•
57

• Fundamentally commercial principles marked the French book-privilege system for its
complete duration. R. Birn, "Malesherbes and the Call for a Free Press", in Revolution in Print.
The Press in France, 1775-1800, (R. Darnton, and D. Roche, eds), Berkeley: U of California
P. 1989, 131-5.

58
59
60

•

See, Bertrand, Le droit d'auteur, at 25; Saunders, Authorship at 83.

•

Saunders, Authorship at 83.

The Napoleonic Civil Code-a post revolutionary codification-- was also the result of
general and legal cultural accomplishments during the previous centuries.
61

•

The ancient network didn't fit neatly into an "aesthetic schema where the persona of the
Romantic author provides the singular goal to which all earlier forms of authorship had to lead."
Saunders, Authorship at 89. (The change in the legal language concerning the author's rights
might be related to the ideology of the times. For example, it is likely that a central political
figure of that time, Lamartine, the revolutionary poet, had a defining role in the language of the
revolutionary codification.)
•
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The eventual revolutionary decrees62 changed nothing63 "either in ideas
or in legislation," except "the word property, it is true" replaced the word
privilege, Laboulay, a 19th century French commentator, noticed64 • Thus the
only real effect of codification65 was to transform what had been a royal
privilege into a legal right of the publisher using the language of the right of the
author, who reminded an incidental figure. The very fact, though, that the new
legal scheme was articulated in terms of author's rights eventually allowed the
author to participate formally in the publication process with no change,
however, in his economic status.

62

•

See, Bertrand, Le Droit d'auteur, 26-8.

63

• If there was a change it was political: instead of a royal privilege, it became a legal
privilege. A capricious human choice was replaced with the power of the nation, perhaps in a
sincere desire for a more stable and equitable 'justice'. In the Age of Enlightment and the
Declaration of Human and Civic Rights, Le Chapelier agreed--concerning the real change in this
field-- that "what was formerly effected in France by virtue of privileges granted by the king;
henceforward it will be by the virtue of a law, a far wiser method and the only one that it is
appropriate to use.• D. Becourt, "The French Revolution and the Authors' Right for a New
Universalism" 143 R.I.D.A. 230, 258 (1990).
64

E. Laboulaye, "Etudes sur la propriete litteraire en France et en Angleterre. Suivies de
trois discours prononces au Parlement d 'Angleterre par Sir T. Noon Talfourd", Auguste Durand,
Paris, 1858: This "property is still a charitable grant from society." (Actually this was the
nature of the book-privileges.)
•

6S.

See supra note no. 55 and the accompanying text.

an eco-esc pendulum of copyright

------------------

26
This commercial grant adopted by revolutionary statutes66 , with their
formal attention to the author's.role, however impotent it might have been in
practical terms, influenced the future continental domestic statutes. (This might
be explained using tlie ripples theory67). Their influence is due either to an
attachment to what has been praised as an individualistic system for the author's
protection68 and which would achieve its culmination in German legislation69 ,
66

About the purely commercial effects of the revolutionary texts, see C. Hesse, "The
Dilemmas of Republican Publishing, 1793-1799", unpublished paper, Library of Congress
Symposium on Publishing and Readership in Revolutionary France and America, 20-1, cited in
Saunders, Authorship, at 93.
67

•

The ripples theory, if it first appeared as a linguistic theory, explaining how new
linguistic changes influence the pre-existing languages from center to margin, and at the margins
of a certain geographic area the pure language might be found, now is used in almost all
sciences to explain correlations between step .by step changes, irrelevant the direction centermargin. For example, see B. Diefenbaucher, "Ripples of technology; new technologies impact
companies from the outside in" Midrange Systems, November 9, 1993.
•

68

• Contrary to the opinion expressed in this paper is the view that the French system is
traditionally author-centric. In this sense, see B. Edelman, "Une loi substantiellement
intemationale. I.a loi du 3 juillet sur les droits d'auteur et droits voisins", Journal du droit
international, 114:563 (1987); J. C. Ginsburg, "A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property
in Revolutionary Franceand America". Tulsa L. Rev., 64:1009 (1990), and 147 R.I.D.A (1991)
125; Saunders, Authorship 89-105; Monta, "The Concept of 'Copyright' versus the "Droit
d'Auteur", 32 So. Cal. L. Rev. 178 (1959).
69

• In Germany, the lack of a centralized legal regulation of the book market--the modem
unified German state was not created until 1870-left the book trade uncontrolled. In this context
the author and publisher stood together •as partners in alliance" to protect their common
merchandise against any unpaid use of it. Saunders Authorship, 106-9.

Consequently, the Germanic countries, before unification and national legislation, had
joined the interests of both business partners: the publisher and the author. The future German
statutes, despite their very 'romantic' language might be understood in this sense. On the
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or simple because the French legal code was widely adopted in toto (or nearly
so) across Europe and beyond, and as a result, so were its literary and artistic
property rules.

c) A NEW COMMERCIAL POLICY

In the United States70 , unlike any other nation, the statutes passed by

Congress dealing with copyright are founded upon Constitutional provisions71 •
The United States was the first political system which understood the real value
of copyrighted works, establishing publishing and knowledge ("writings" and
"science") as constitutionally valued. And the presence of the Copyright Clause
proved it. The 1790 Act72 , is above all an instrument of governmental
influence of both English and French legislation in Germany, see G. Boytha, "The Justification
of the Protection of Author's Rights as Reflected in Their Historical Development" 151 R.I.D.A.
53, 84 (1992)
70

71

•

See supra note 43.

See supra note no. 43.
For the Constitutional provisions respecting copyright, see M. B. Nimmer, "Copyright
and Other Aspects of Law Pertaining to Literary, Musical and Artistic Works" 2d ed. West
Publishing Co., 1978, 912.
72

•

See supra, note no. 43.
This was the first American Copyright Act, modelled on the Statute of Anne, and setting
the tone for future American statutes. Leaffer, Understanding Copyright, at 4.
•
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"policing, "73 the regulation of an otherwise a free market, aimed simply at
developing an infant publishing industry. It was clearly not necessary to impose
protective legislation in those years at the very beginning of the establishment
of American publishing74 , so much as to encourage its development. Its relative
lack of commercial restrictions, its implied freedom to publish widely--today
called "piracy"--was a boon to publishers.

73

Without seeking to narrowly circumscribe the present paper within any philosophical
context, in the circumstances of an American copyright law pursuant to the express constitutional
infrastructure, it seems reasonably to postulate that its original purpose was encoui;agement of
a "national uniformity" within the frame of a very important trade. Here, similarly to the
Commercial Clause, the Framers "must have referred to a system of law coextensive" with and
operating uniformly in, the whole country.
•

There are cases in which commercial or maritime issues are expressly solved by at least
passing reference to the Patent and Copyright Clause: Dred Scott v. John F. A. Sandford, (60
U.S. 393; 15 L. Eel. 691; 19 How. 393.term: 1856); In Chae Chan Ping v. United States (130
U.S. 581; 32 L. Eel. 1068; 9 S. Ct. 623. 1889) the Supreme Court said that the United States
"form, and for most important purposes, a single nation", and in all "commercial regulations,
we are one and the same people."
What else might the Framers of the American Nation have imagined when they
established the Copyright Clause, without benefit to any other foreign constitution, if not to
encourage a single book-market within the new federation's borders? By promoting the spread
of a sole language for the entire population, they facilitated the fabrication of a new common
civilization, and the rise of a new nation.
Advocating this idea, see The Fred E. Sander (208 F. 724, D. C. W. D. Washington,
N. D. 1913).
74

On the mutual relationship between the beginning of an American publishing industry
which copied without cost the products of British authors and publishers, and the provisions of
American copyright statutes, see Saunders, Authorship, at 155.
•
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This brief review of copyright laws as private commercial regulations
suggest the following:

The regulation of book production and distribution appeared and spread in the
world as a direct consequence of very pragmatical concerns75 • The

book~

privileges--a creation of the Italian and German cities-expanded across Europe
in order to secure an industry and a profession: printing and printers. When the
English Statute of Anne-and later other continental and overseas statutes76-invoked author's rights, it was to legitimize emotionally the existence of a

75

• Certainly, that set of rules was induced by the technological revolution. "The fortunes
of the law of copyright have always been closely connected with freedom of expression, on the
one hand, and with technological improvements in means of dissemination, on the other."
Kaplan, An Unhurried View, vii-viii.

(For more about the necessity of the enforcement of copyright law for new technological
methods of both reproduction and dissemination of works covered by such a law, see Nimmer,
"Foreword: Two Copyright Crises", 15 UCLA L. Rev. 931, 931.)
However, even if technology is regarded as the direct inducement of copyright laws, it
might be understood by the fact that technology is an element immanent in human progress, and
that the rise of economic, social, and psychological conditions which supplied the world
information and made society informationally depended would have been impossible without
technological progress. In such circumstances the application of a rule to police and to promote
information, it became unavoidable and that rule was called "copyright."
76

• On the relativity of which is influenced by which, see Ball, The Law of Copyright, at 18,
criticizing the claim that the Statute of Anne owes its origin to Dutch influence and customs
respecting monopolies.
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national industrial policy in otherwise free market economy77, for the rest of
society78 •
The result is an extraordinary consideration given to the book trade. Why
this occurred in publishing and, apparently, nowhere else (except perhaps
mechanical inventions) is almost inexplicable. Perhaps, publishing received such
consideration due to some premonition of its future role in the worldwide
distribution of power.

B. AS A COMMERCE WITH INFORMATION79

77

• "Although the rights could have been awarded to the publishers directly, the chosen
solution was to vest the rights initially in 'authors' , with the understanding that the publisher
eventually will assume control.• Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright, at 468.

78

On an identical phenomena of legitimacy in another area of intellectual property --trade
marks-·, see M. H. Davis, "Death Of a Salesman's Doctrine: A Critical Look at Trademark
Use", in 19 Ga. L. Rev. 233 (1981).
79

•

If "copyright statutes" are commercial regulations, they have to regulate the trade of
goods, meaning objects with social value. Indeed, they regulate commerce in information.
Information interests the public at large and the government. The public at large is interested in
knowledge for reasons unknown to me, and the government is interested in information in order
to use it for reasons which are only slightly less unknown.
•
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a) ADVOCATING CITIZENS' KNOWLEDGE

Copyright regulations80, may be easier understood if they are divided into
Copyright-common law-, and Authorship-civil law-- systems81 • While the
Copyright system82 has protected communication of lmowledge based both on
a pragmatic economic calculus as well as respect for personal authorial
values83 , the Authorship system84 has sought legitimacy with obstination based
80
81
82

83

•

See, note no.1.

•

See supra notes nos. 1-3.

•

See supra note no. 2.

In my opinion, the modem text used by the American Framers to break with the old
civilization and whose transparent purpose was to encourage the formation of a new nation
through cultural production, created not only a pedestal but also its cage. Encouraging a new
industry become a cage, in the sense that in the name of the author new formerly unimagined
economic rights were vested and for a longer period of time than the few older rights which had
been known. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) the Supreme
Court utilized the "authorship" concept to justify that copyright could constitutionally extend to
photographs. See, Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright, 480.
•

A strong relation has been created between authorship and the extension of copyright
subject matter, in the sense that everything which is originated by a human author could be
copyrighted. The "authorship" concept continued "(and continues) to be strategically deployed
to extend copyright protection to new kinds of subject matter", id.
Today, the irony is that "authorship," seen as a quality of human beings advantaged
impersonal and corporate entrepreneurs who paid only a simple wage for the appropriation of
their human-employees' creations. Consequently, all the advantages of this powerful exclusive
monopoly do not seem to be used now, in the majority of cases, either to encourage creativity,
or benefit the author, even if as secondary ·policy of the law ( e.g. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,
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solely on the authorial values as its reason for the protection of literary and
artistic works85 •

1. SHORT IDSTORY

Before the invention of printing, the right of transcribing copies of a book
was the right of every man86 , justified by natural justice and the public welfare,
which necessitated the widest possible diffusion of learning87 • In the Italian and
German cities, very advanced communities, a segment of society appeared,
"which had virtually been absent from Europe since the collapse of the Roman

286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) characterized this author's reward as a secondary consideration).
84

•

See supra note no. 3.

85

• Henry Desbois is France's leading modern exponent of the theory postulating substantial
difference between Copyright and the "Droit d' Auteur", on the ground that the French system
unconditionally protects the author. In "Le droit d'auteur en France" (3rd ed., Paris, Dalloz,
1978, at 538), he writes that the French Parliament has repudiated the utilitarian concept of
protecting works of authorship in order to stimulate literary and artistic activity. To the contrary,
he concludes the author is protected in the new legislation just because of his own status of
author.
86

•

See Ball, The Law of Copyright, at 21.

.., . A revealing example of the deep connection between literature and mass communication
in the Middle Ages, is that of the Italians who were so impressed with the achievements of
Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio, that the Tuscan dialect in which they wrote became the literary
language "per excellence of the whole of Italy.• Koenigsberger, t.1, at 369.
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Empire." This educated laity88 , which represented not only the market, but
whose very existence represented the reason for disseminating ideas, influenced
the Europe intellectual life.

2. THE ENGLISH PRE-INFORMATIONAL SOCIETY

In England, a singular "path of economic rationality", demanded the

enforcement of statutory protection of expressed ideas. In comparison with the
previous system based on guild protectionism89, the new commercial statutory
regime was regarded as progressive. (1) By limiting any owner's copyright
monopoly --and in this way promoting dissemination of ideas and values of

88

• Even ifKoenigsberger (t.II, at 19), expressly referred only to the Christian laity, it does
seem to me that his assumption applying equally to the entire community of literate European
people.
.

89

Not only was competition between businessmen in the literary market eliminated by
abolition of guild-type protection, but this eradication had also injured authors. Under guild
protectionism, book production was encouraged, at least for the reason that stationers could
afford publishing costs, by sharing them.
•

About the damage the stationers' perpetual monopoly would have produced, see the
opinion of Lord Karnes in Hinton v. Donaldson (1773) Mor 8307. Perpetuating that monopoly,
he said, " will unavoidable raise the price of good books beyond the reach of ordinary readers."
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mass-education--9(), and (2) authorizing others besides the stationers to join the
book business91 the statute had liberal effects. Scholars agreed that it was the
right policy for a prosperous 18th century92 : within a growing demand for
consumer goods, a rapidly increasing number of local newspapers developed
which reciprocally influenced the demand for literary entertainment and
"people's desire for knowledge. "93 .
The English legislation had the important intuition, in order to support the
dissemination of ideas to emphasize the importance of dispatching works, that
is of relating publication and the genesis of "copyright. It makes the benefit of
II

the book trade subject to publication. But this was decided by the case law;

90

• In his opinion in Hinton v. Donaldson, Lord Karnes said that "a perpetual monopoly of
books would prove more destructive to learning, and even to authors, than a second irruption
of Goths and Vandals." (Cited in MacQueen, Copyright, Competition, 3-4.)

To emphasize that the scope of copyright policy was to support mass education, the Act
of 1842 began with the following words: "Whereas it is expedient to amend the law relating to
Copyright and to afford greater Encouragement to the Production of Literary Works of Lasting
to the World ... " Whale on Copyright; at 15.
·
91

•

I.e. the authors, proprio nomine.

92

• R. D. Mayo, "The English Novel in the Magazines 1740-1815," Evanston, IL:
Northwestern UP, London: Oxford UP, 1962; R. A. Posner, "Law and Literature, A
Misunderstood Relationship," Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1988, at 351; Saunders,
Authorship, 54-5.

93

•

Koenigsberger, t.II, at 299.
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Donaldson v. Becket94 found that an exclusive right of publication could only
be established by statute for a limited period after publication95 •

3. THE FIRST INFORMATIONAL SOCIETY: THE
UNITED STATES

In America, the importance of publishing96 was stressed as in no other

place97 • Congress, exercising for the first time its power vested in it by the
Constitution in Art. I, § 898 , "to promote the progress of science and useful

94

• 4 Burrows, 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774), citation from I.atman's Copyright, at 3 (The
quotations differ·from Rose's: 4 Burr 2408, 98 ER 257, in Rose, Authors at 172)

95
96

•

In this sense, see I.atman's Copyright at 3, Yen, Restoring the Natural I.aw, at 528.

About the meaning of "publish" and its derivatives, see Jones, Copyright, at 11, where
the word 'published, is used in the sense of "to reveal" or "to make known", and "publish"
means to issue copies to the public. See in the same sense Am. Inst. Architects v. Fenichel, ·
41 F.S. 146 COB 24: 45 (1941).
•

97

• This is so perhaps because in the United States, as in no other place, the codification of
common law copyright was prompted by new communications technology, which generated a
new "national" economic sector: the entertainment industry.

"The development of a medium of mass communication almost inevitably results in the
development of a service industry", Patterson explains, making a parallel with development of
the printing press which "led to copyright." Copyright Overextended at 392.
98

•

The Patent and Copyright Clause was adopted in final form without debate in a secret

proceeding on September 5, 1787. Leaffer, Understanding Copyright, at 4. In the language of

an eco-esc pendulum of copyright

----------------

-

36
arts "99 , articulated its extraordinary significance100 • At the end of the 18th
century, when most American cemeteries contained no more than one or two
generations, at most, of graves, publication was extremely important for the
task of creating a new sense of nationhood.
In a technical sense, publication meant that commercial protection under

state laws of book exploitation ceased101 , with the possibility of either: (1) a
broader copyright protection under the federal regime, or (2) its definitive loss.
(The federal statutory protection was not originally received automatically by

the Copyright Clause, "the dominant idea is to promote the dissemination of knowledge to
enhance public welfare." id.
99

See Wheaton v. Peterson, 8 Pet. 591, 8 L.Ed. 1055 (1834). This case, Saunders says,
"is the American counterpart of Donaldson v. Becket." See also Banks v. Manchester, 128
U.S. 244, 225, cited Shaw, Literary Property, at 174; Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123,
151, id.
•

Even before the first federal statute was adopted, the states passed copyright acts with
the same declared purpose, e.g., Connecticut passed a copyright act in 1783, which was entitled
"An Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius", in Act and Laws of Conn. Jan. Sess.
1783.
100

Even if its meaning might seem obvious, due to the secrecy of the "committee
proceedings which considered the copyright clause", there is no helpful Ameriean legislative
history available to determine the real meaning or extent of the first copyright law. 1 M.
Nimmer, "Nimmer on Copyright" (MB)@ 1.01 [A] (1985); S. Shoenfeld, "The Applicability
of Eleventh Amendment Immunity under the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976", 36 Am. U. L.
Rev. 163, 163 (1986).
•

101

• "Publication was the trigger mechanism that terminated state protection and activated
federal protection.• Boorstyn, Copyright Law, at 4
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publication alone 102 .)
The drafters of United States copyright emphasized and relied upon the
English model and rationale: to raise the level of mass education through the
fruits of commerce in published works 103 • Accordingly, the 1790 statute
allowed the free importation, vending, reprinting and publishing of any book
written or published abroad by any person not being a citizen of the States, to
provide "affordable English-language reading matter for the growing
population." 104

102

.See above note no. 91.

For more on the importance of the moment of publication, see Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus.
210 U.S.346, 347: When •a work is published in print, the owner's common law rights are lost,
and unless the publication be in accordance with the requirements of the statute, the statutory
right is not secured.• This case, even if dated 1907, articulates a long legal tradition.
(Common law copyright, for the purpose of this paper, may be defined as the perpetual
right of "an author to his unpublished creations", which included "the right to decide when, if,
and how to publish the work", granted by each state inside its borders. See, Miller and Davis,
Intellectual Property, 281.)
103

"The federal Act of 1790 --'for the encouragement of learning by securing copies of
maps, charts and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies'-- treats copyright as being
a protection for works that are 'useful'." Saunders, Authorship, at 155.
•

104

• With a population smaller than Britain's but a reading population that was larger, the
United States represented the largest literate public there had ever been, and larger editions and
lowei:per-volume prices were the rule. J. Tebbe!, "A ffistory of Book Publishing in the United
States: the Creation of an Industry 1630-1865", R.R. Bowker, NY, 1972, 157-9. If copyright
was meant to create a literate population and it was effective at all, it certainly effective in the
U.S ..

an eco-esc pendulum of copyright

-----------

--

38

4.

INFORMATIONAL

POLICY

ON

THE

OLD

CONTINENT

The continental moral right105 belonging to authors, always a source-often a stereotype, sometimes a caricature--of the difference between EnglishAmerican and continental systems 106 , might be described as clear evidence of
the state interest in promoting learning, the spread of knowledge, and
communication. Even if adopted 'later than the "opposite," common law,
copyright statutes, and thus that model was waiting to be pragmatically
improved, in fact, the French revolutionary law explicitly provided just the
author's pecuniary right in his work 107 • Far from being a legislative creation,
the moral right108 is a sort of continental "common law" creation, in the sense
105

106

•

See the definition in "Whale on Copyright", at 14.

•

See Gainsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights, R.I.D.A. 125.

1
ITT.

See, "La Ioi des 19-24juillet1793 relative aux droits de propriete d'ecnts en tout genre,
des compositeurs de musique, des peintres et des dessinateurs", in Bertrand, Le droit d' auteur,
27-8.
108
•

Each country member to the Berne Convention have ensured "moral rights" from the
moment it joined it. United States, however, ensure "moral rights" very limited to just visual
arts.
.
Nevertheless, when Monty Pyton--Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14 (2<;1. Cir. 1976) is seen
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that at its origin is

the case law

109

•

as a famous case of inoral rights, it became very interesting for the purpose of this paper,
because it makes clear that so-called moral rights are granted not for the author's sake, but to
protect the work. (For different opinions about this topic, see E. M. Brooks, "Titled' Justice:
Site-Specific Art and Moral Rights after U.S. Adherence to the Berne COnvention," 77 Calif.
L. Rev. 1431 (1989); J. Ginsburg, "Moral Rights in a Common Law System," Moral Rights
Protection in a Copyright System, P. Anderson, and D. Saunders, eds., Institute for Cultural
Policy Studies, Grifith U., 1992, 13-50.)
In civil law countries, providing the other type of author's rights, is not a large or
meaningful one: the author enjoys the right of recognition of his authorial quality, which means
the right to be identified under his real/chosen name; the right to be designated as the real
author; and the right to be identified with her work. (For example, the 1957 French Copyright
Act provides in art. 6:
"L'auteur juit du droit au respect de son nom, de sa qualite et de son oeuvre.
"Ce droit est attache a sa personne.
"TI est perpetuel, inalienable, et imprescriptible.
"TI est transmissible a cause de mort aux hentiers de !'auteur.
"L' exercice peut en etre confere a un tiers en vertu de dispositions testamentaires." For the
original textx, see Bertrand, Le droit d'auteur, 723-44.)
(I do not enjoy the role of forcing Gods from Olympus' cloudy peak. Actually I believe
in them and in fact, they are innate to human thoughts. But, Gods live in Olympus because the
public want them there, and authors in any legal system receive almost nothing more than what
is due any other worker or investor. With or without an elaborate legal fiction, Shakespeare
created plays and remains Shakespeare, needing no explanatory footnotes. Wherefore, why do
we have such elaborate structures evidencing such legislative concern for the author's welfare,
when all that is important for the society where she is living is his work? Isn't it because many
others hide their own interests, behind the authors' , and legitimize them using the socially
manipulated false belief, that the strong commercial monopoly is for the author's benefit? And
what better way to stop any suspicious if not with the "moral rights" argument?)
109

Beginning with 1828, the "droit moral" surfaced in French judgments. See the decision
of the Paris Appellate Court/ Cour de Paris, 11 January 1828.S.1828/30.2.5; Marquam c./v.
Lehuby, Paris Lower Court/Tribunal Grande Instance, 22 August 1845, Table D.1845, cited
in Bertrand, Le droit d'auteur, at 219.
•

The new right owes its appellation as "droit moral" to a scholar, Andre Morillot. He
first used it in his article "De la personnalite du droit de publication qui appartient a un auteur
vivant" in Revue critique de legislation at 29 (1872).
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Grasping the inner nature of this right -that it cannot be assigned,
remaining in the work itself110- , and its duration -lasting the work's life and
The Moral Right/le droit moral was incorporated in the French legislation between 1900s
and the 1930s. Id. 218-20.
110

• Usually it is said that the moral right is a right of personality, and that it is
misunderstood as an author's grant. But, when in 1785 Kant interpreted the content of the book
as the speech of the author, and characterized it as "jus personalissimum" he created a doctrine
ideally suited to protect books against distortion.

Thus when a book's content is assimilated with human personality, an infringer can then
easily be perceived in the public eye, that is in the sense of legitimacy, as a criminal. For a
concise history of the evolution of "Urheberrecht", Boytha, The justification of the Protection,
at 85.
Another persuasive example that the moral right is not established for the author's
benefit, but for the benefit of the work, to preserve the integrity of its content-that is to secure
the social value of the work-- is the relatively recent Huston case. As Prof. Fran~n remarked
(About the decision of the Appellate Court of Paris--Cour d' Appel, 4e Chambre--Juin 6, 1989,
in 143 R.I.D.A. (1990) 339) its solution was predetermined by the case involving "The Kid"
(the French Supreme Court--Cour de Cassation, lre Civ.-May 28, 1963. With respect to "The
Kid", the French Court acknowledged Charlie Chaplin's right to oppose any alteration of his
work's integrity--such as adding music to his silent film.)
Concerning Huston's "Asphalt Jungle", the French Supreme Court-Cour de Cassation,
May 28, 1991-, reversing the intermediary court decision, ruled also in favor of the work's
integrity, and against its colorization.
About that decision's echoes, see A. Kerever, "Addendum", 149 R.I.D.A. (1991) 15,
and J. Ginsburg, and P. Sirinelli, •Author, Creation and Adaptation in Private International Law
and French Domestic Law. Reflections Based on the Huston Case(l)" 150 R.I.D.A. (1991) 3.

Therefore, what else is the effect of so called "moral rights"-- as rights of paternity and
integrity--, if not to secure protection of the work's content, and of its original social value,
preserving not only its initial information, but the consumer's right of access to and payment for
the genuine material?
See also above note no. 104.
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not subject to author's or her assignee's. longevity111- , it might be suggested
that the rationale of moral right is to pl"otect the communication of knowledge
against any distortion or falsification. The moral right safeguards the public's
interest in an undistorted work for its whole eXistence not the author's. In this
way, it may be argued that in the last instance the moral right protects
consumers against confusion and deception112 , though clearly this the
traditional domain of trademarks and unfair competition laws, not copyright.
Accordingly, the moral right appears to be actually created in a desire to secure
a mass-communication morality.

b) GOVERNING THE PUBLIC'S KNOWLEDGE
1. GENERALITIES
-

The new product--the published book--had a major disadvantage for an

111

See Bertrand, Le droit d'auteur, at 237: "Contrairement au droit moral qui est
'perpetuel', les 'droits patrimoniaux ( ... ) d'auteur sont limites dans le temps."/ While the moral
right is forever, the economic rights are limited in time.
·
112

• In this sense it may be argued that the function played by the moral right is as a kind
of trade mark of the work, identifying for the consumer a reliable source: its author. For an
overview of American trade mark protection, see Miller and Davis, Intellectual Property, 146279.
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article of commerce: instead of vanishing with the first act of consumption-as
an apple-, to become no more than a memory, it remains capable of nourishing
friends and generations, and to be used continually for shaping minds and filling
needs. The same popular princes who encouraged printing as a Renaissance
vogue 113 were first to apprehend its danger. The printed word might imperil
their popularity, for instance by spreading news and ideologies subversive to
political regimes as never before. Consequently, the production of this new
commodity became supervised. Not only were the secular princes interested in
it, but so were religious leaders114 •
In Venice, where the first form of legal protection of literary production
appeared --the book privilege-, the intertwining of the privilege system with
censorship first surfaced. The compromise between copyright as a source of
incentive and a means of censorship which the Venice solution represented was,

113

• H. S. White, "The Copyright Dilemma". ALA. Chicago. 1978. at 4: "The attitude
toward printing and publication, although favorable because of the Renaissance and Reformation,
in some ways resembles the contemporary attitude toward plutonium. Both were considered
good, perhaps even necessary, but fraught with the possibilities of explosive harm to church and
state were they to fall into the hands of any but godly and loyal subjects." [hereinafter White,
The Copyright Dilemma]
114

The Catholic "officials" were also threatened by the Reformation propaganda.
Koenigsberger, t.II, 64-70.
•
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for centuries, the European model 115 •

2. THE ENGLISH PUBLIC CENSORSIIlP

The Statute of Anne appeared to be a formal separation of copyright and
censorship 116 • Even though it was "a successor to a series of privileges,
1

Rose, Authors and Owners, at 11: In Venice, in the middle years of the sixteenth
century, "a guild of printers and booksellers. was organized as an instrument for government
surveillance of the press. "
1.S.

116

•

Rose, Authors and Owners, at 16 and 48.

"In 1556 Queen Mary incorporated the Stationers Company with extensive powers for
the suppression of obnoxious books.(.-) In 1585 a decree of the Star Chamber required the
licensing of every book or other publication and prohibited the printing of any book in violation
of any ordinance of the Stationers Company." Ball, the Law of Copyright, at 9.
Printing was subject to the orders of the Star Chamber so that the Government and the
Church could exercise effective censorship and prevent seditious or heretical works from getting
into print. Hallam, 1 "Constitutional History", 238, cited in Latman's Copyright, at 2.
Henry VIII's printers' regulation act, officially titled "An Act for preventing the frequent
Abuses in printing seditious treasonable and unlincesed Books and Pamphlets and for regulating
of Printing and Printing Press" was designed to prevent the printing and sale of "heretical
schismatical blasphemous seditious and treasonable Bookes, Pamphlets and Papers" ("Statutes
of the Realm" 5:428); Rose, Authors and Owners, at 31.
Queen Elizabeth I was also concerned about controlling what was published, and used
a "very stringent and efficient system of licensing.• The stationers were "essentially printers or
publishers, to whom the government gave• for censorship reasons, a monopoly which "carried
the seeds of copyright.• White, The Copyright Dilemma at 4.
"Copyright in Historical Perspective" 1968. This function might explain the Crown's
claims of rights regarding the use of Bills, Acts of Parliament, Statutory Rules and Orders,

an eco-esc pendulum of copyright

44
monopolies, decrees, and licensing acts in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century"
primarily designed to maintain governmental control of printing117 it was
nevertheless regarded as severing the merged interests of government and the
book industry.

3. A CONTINENTAL ATTITUDE
i) THE FRENCH ATTITUDE

A similarly express system of monopolistic control of the book market
could have been found under the French ancien regime. The system of book
privileges was described as a "coalition of interests between censors and traders
--the royal government and the printer-bookseller associates of the Communaute
des Imprimeurs et Libraires de Paris. "118 Governmental censorship continued
Statutory Instruments, Parliamentary Papers, Hansards, papers. of Government departments,
Ministry of Defence maps and Ordinance Survey publications, "independently of any question
of prerogative.• J. A. L. Sterling & M. C. L. Carpenter, "Copyright Law in the United
Kingdom and the Rights of Performers, Authors and Composers in Europe", Legal Books PTY,
London, 1986 at 105 [hereinafter Sterling, Copyright Law].
117
118

•

Copyright. Current Viewpoints on History, at 1.

The "cement of this coalition was the reliable power of exclusion, both of counterorthodoxy and of non-establishment Parisian and provincial printers and booksellers." Saunders,
Authorship, at 84.
•
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in France until the Revolution, when for political reasons--the radical rejection
of the oppressive practices associated with the ancien regime--,it was abolished
along with the privilege system119 •

ii) A GOTIDC ATTITUDE

When a "national" regulation of the book market was enforced in
Germany in the 1840s, it was influenced by the powerful German philosophical
texts 120 , which self-consciously promoted its authors' interests. It did not
specifically or expressly embrace censorship, due perhaps to two phenomena:
(1) German nationalism had arrived making it less likely that the loyalty of
German subjects towards their secular heads could be threaten. (2) And on the
other hand, in Christian terms, Germany was the Reformation country, which
would not tolerate reminders of religious censorial system121 •
119 •

On August 4, 1789 the privileged were abolished and on August 26 "La d&:laration des
droits de 1'homme et du citoyen" was adopted. This became an opportunity to change the literary
property policies. On the author's rights in this context, see "Bienvenue a la loi" 19 R.I.D.A.,
1958, at 9.
120

• See, I. Kant, "The Metaphysics of Morals. Part 1: The Metaphysical Elements of
Justice", trans. J. Ladd. Bobbs-Merrill. NY. 1965.
121

•

For logical reasons it couldn't be against it.
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In this context, the metamorphosis of what had been book privileges

metamorphose into statutory form assumed a very sophisticated and commercial
profile. For better or worse, legal fictions legitimized the author's right in his
work. But even if the German statutory language may be regarded as
"romantic"-for instance, the author's right cannot be assigned, only licensednothing suggests an "author-centric" system, that is that the author was the sole
and true object of legislation122•
Germany is the place where the author was first identified, in a sense of
immanency, with his work, and, unfortunately, the place where people have
always been most effectively controlled by government. Excluding any
intermediary assignee between the author and his work, the German legislation
in a sense ratified German philosophy concerning authorship. From the moment
of its genesis the only responsible party for a book's content was its author.
Thus, the statutory language might be read more as a philosophical statement

122

A relevant example is offered by the present Gennan Copyright Law of 1965. By its
terms, "Copyright shall protect the author with respect to his intellectual and personal relations
to the work, and also with respect to the utilization of the work." (UNESCO translation). Since
one element of the author's right is conceived of as linassignable, and that element "is an integral
part of a single right, it follows that the right cannot be assigned (that is, the ownership
transferred), although it can pass by testamentary· disposition. " Whale on Copyright, at 15.
•
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and less as a democratic proof'23 •

4. THE UNITED STATES AND·CENSORSHIP

The form of copyright protection promoted and adopted by the United
States seems formally oriented towards one major goal: mass education124 • As
one example, the earliest statutory subject matter was obviously limited to works
of sheer information such as maps and charts, and in the

form~

sense, it was

at the end where the word books appears.
It may be more than mere speculation to suspect early American copyright
for a reluctant treatment of pooks 125 ; the Framers' attitude towards works of
123

Fichte and Kant constructed the rationale for literary property in Germany, known as
"Urheberrecht" .For details, see Saunders, Authorship, 106-21.
•

124

• I say "formally", because American copyright law is also viewed as "a descendant of
the British Crown's program of censorship through an elaborate licensing scheme for
publishers." "Toward a Unified Theory of Copyright Infringement for an Advanced
Technological Era". 96 Harvard L. Rev. at 450.

125

• By the terms of the Copyright Act of 1790, indeed, technically "books" were
copyrightable without qualification. As Jefferson's contemporaneous comments show, works of
fiction were not at all desirable and/or necessary for the intellectual formation of a new nation.
This particular attitude seems to have influenced American case law concerning the allowance
of statutory copyright protection.

The idea of "authorship" as a major condition of book protection developed as the
beginning and end of any further subject matter. And I suggest, with it developed a
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fiction was certainly rather equivocal. Certainly works of fiction did not really
satisfy the federal policy of encouraging mass Iearning126 understood in light
of Jefferson's precepts 127 • (Not only did this attitude arguably influence the
cultural tastes of the Framers' epoch, but it has marked the overall
jurisprudential attitude towards copyright subject matter, which was never
subject to any recognition or assessment of aesthetic values128 .)
transformation of the idea of author and his/her protection from the object of protection to
simply the right holder. The "cornerstone of American copyright law"--Wheaton v. Paterson,
decided in 1834--, narrowed the quality of the copyright owner to simply the one originating the
"book". In this order of the development of ideas, the only articulable goal of copyright becomes
simply the protection of the fruits of human labor. How this umbilical relationship evolved is
a later question for this paper.
126

• Perhaps, a distinct relationship could be postulated relating to the development or
encouragement of a facility for assimilating information, i.e. science, in order to encourage its
more informational production later.

127. •A great obstacle to good education is the inordinate passion prevalent for novels,
and the time lost in that reading which should be instructively employed". T. Jefferson, "The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson" vol. 15. ed. A. A. Lipscombe, Washington, D.C. 1903 (no pub)
at 166, cited in Saunders, Authorship, at 254.
128

• Perhaps, to achieve mass education it was necessary also to encourage a homogenization
of cultural tastes, and to support works of nude information, which the 18th century novel
definitely was not. The Constitutional Copyright Clause, in light of the First Amendment, is
usually treated as a fonn of protection of free expressed thoughts, with the only early condition
being that they be originated by American citizens.

In 1903, Justice Holmes decided as a logical extension of this axiom, that no matter how
"poor artistically the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his own." Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239.

On the incorporation of free speech values the copyright clause of the Constitution, see,
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Thus with a copyright regime embracing a very narrow range of purely
informational works, a stated policy supporting mass education, and an
underlying goal of encouraging a national publishing industry, it would be
difficult to imagine governmental censorship as even a disguised policy129 • The
sole role of the government seems to have been effectively intervention cabined
within the express terms of an admittedly narrow copyright statute.
Thus, aside from the statute, the publishing industry was almost
uncontrolled. At that time the publishing industry was concentrated more on
imported books, and this apparent lack of federal policy effectively advantaged
both businessmen and consumers by lower prices on the American market, and
in fact on average four times less expensive than those on the British

L. R. Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use", in 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1987, p.l.
129

•

See also infra note no. 138.

There could be no governmental censorship in the classical meaning of enforced rules
prohibiting certain publications. However, censorship of information, whether directly by the
government or indirectly by other institutional groups for purportedly economic or other reasons
is a part of any society, the difference being basically ideological.
The new kind of censorship accomplished by virtue of copyright law in the 20th century
is basically exercised by the owner of copyrighted work, usually distinct from the author, ergo
by a private authority.
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market130 •

*

*
*

Quite obviously, books were the first important copyrighted works in
human civilization: Through them people were informed while, paradoxically,
governments were protected.
The economic history of book production and the history of copyright131
are one and the same. Over several centuries, the economic role of books
changed, altering their authors' and publisher' rank also. Books have obviously
unique social value, because of their advantage of being both a depository and
accelerator of knowledge, as well, of course, as an irreplaceable source of
pleasure. Therefore, a wide range of social groups including but going far
130

• The biggest American firms grew "to dwarf their transatlantic counterparts." There was
nothing in London to rival Harper Brothers who, by mid-century, occupied seven five-store
buildings and turned out over 2,000,000 volumes a year.

And, the same author adds, "as a rule of thumb, the American operated at four times the
size of edition and a quarter of the cost of the British publishers." However, when the British
author or publisher "had authorized an American publisher to reproduce their works for the
American market, in some instances they received ex gratia payments from the latter."
Saunders, Authorship, at 156.
131

•

See note no. 1.
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beyond merely, lay and/or religious authorities, have always had a keen stake
in their commerce.
Among other economic and cultural qualities, books possess an
unchallenged superiority over any other source of information: When they
ceased b~ing an elite source of information or of culture they became relatively
cheap commodities, and with their greater dissemination they have tended to
become even cheaper. Many economic and political factors have been favorable
to book production ( e.g., educational systems, library policies, as well as the
increase in leisure time), and they in their turn demonstrate their own sensitivity
to the increasing influence of books in society.
During this time, while the author's role has been more as an object of
social gratitude and philosophical schools (generating for instance, an enlighten
statutory language, especially in Europe 132), the publishing community has
been more keenly aware of its social tasks and functions, developing an
economically powerful base. Organized in professional guilds, publishers had
originally received only the commercial monopoly in the authors' works

132

• See, Ph. Gaudrat, "Le point de vue d'un auteur sur la titularite"/"An Author's Point of
View about Authorship,• Le droit d'auteur aujourd'hui, Larnberterie, I. (ed.) C.N.R.S 1991,
43.
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produced with the publishers' money. Later, on the basis of their ideological
justification--the author's natural rights--, publishers shared the potential
economic benefits, theoretically, with the works' authors.
With the increasing task and burden of the distribution and dissemination
of books, the role of the publisher has changed dramatically in the last two
centuries. Had publishers never regarded their income until then as due to
anything but the authors' creations, and not necessarily to their own activities,
they would certainly do so now with the intensive development of book
exploitation. With the maturation of the publishing professions (editorial,
production, and distribution), and the alienating effects of modern industrial
Western civilizations, the publisher gained the apparently good reasons to
explain to the author, that royalties "do not fall from heaven, but are largely the
fruit" 133 of the publishers' efforts. Publishing as an economic activity certainly
133

• L. van Krevelen, "The Information Society and the Right of the Publisher'',
Intemationales Urheberrechts-Symposium, Heidelberg, 24-5 April 1986, J. Schweitzer Verlag,
Miinchen, 1986, 100-1 [hereinafter Internationales Urheberrechts].

According to van Krevelen, the publishing monopolies' escape the abolition of the French
revolution thanks to the theory that they were in fact property rights (property was regarded as
a fundamental right) and not feudal rights. Intemationales Urheberrechts at 90. (Perhaps this
means an implied acceptance of the publisher's real status as a Venician merchant who uses his
relationship with the author to promote his own interest, justifying that interest lll! a property
right.)
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flourished and the role of the publishers was so economically key that the role
of the author inevitably diminished.
Consequently, it .seems more accurate to claim that the publisher's saga
(not the author's) and copyright history134 are one and the same: The publisher
forced the legislator's hand in adopting favorable copyright statutes, and these
laws have reflected commercial policies of an ordinary (though so protected that
"ordinary" seems to insult those other entrepreneurs forced to contend with truly
competitive conditions) trade.
What remains wrong in this calculus is its terms. Publishers, and others
with an interest in copyrighted works, did not play the game on their own

On the current relations between publishers and authors, like the author's payment under

different national statutes, see C. Colombet, "Grands principes du droit d'auteur et des droits
voisins dans le monde. Approche de droit compare" Litec, UNFSCO, 1990, 88-93, although,
unfortunately, this is not a vary reliable source for many domestic statutes.
Although troublesome in many respects, a case such as Harper & Row, Publishers v.
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539; 105 S.Ct. 2218; 85 L.Ed. 2d 588; 53 U.S.L.W.4562; 225
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1073; 11 Media L. Rep. 1969 (1985) might be regarded as a case of unfair
competition between two publishers in the battle for the optimum profit from an author's
manuscript. This is even more like an unfair competition case when the (mis?)conduct of the
defendant is considerably key, as seems to be the case upon a close reading.
134

•

See note no. 1.

On the similarity between Anglo-American eopyright and the author's rightldroit d'auteur
system with respect to author-publisher relations, see D. Ladd, "The Utility of a Publisher's
Right", Internationales Urheberrechts, at. 90.
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merits, but instead relied on the argument that they were only vindicating the
author's natural rights in her own work. This situation, however, generally
accepted with little or no question, should by rights last nevermore, because that
which publishers claim to have secure under copyright135 is not Poe's raven,
but its commercialization.

135

•

See supra note no. 1.
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BOOK II. SEASONING
A. COPYRIGHT IN 20TH CENTURY. GENERALITIES

My unequivocal opinion that historically, copyright merely regulated a
particular business concerning an even more particular merchandise, and never
. attempted for romantic or other reasons to vest meaningful rights in the author,
remains the same for events in this century. Ideas are valuable by their very
essence: but they become marketable only when they achieve a social value, that
is when communicated to others, and that occurs when they became published
"writings." 136
As described above137 , they produce a benefit if secured by commercial

monopoly 138 • This monopoly, however, only advantages its actual recipients
136
137

•

The term "writings" is used in its broad American constitutional meaning.

•

See, Book I, first part.

138. These beneficiaries are the merchants of writings. To legitimize their interests in
the eyes of rest of an otherwise free market society the author's own right was created and
included in this lucrative game. This legitimacy has been so impeccably managed that for almost
300 years under its protection, merchants have been able to expand their rights to an
approximate 75-100-year monopoly, and it remains apparently honest to everybody.
Under the Berne Convention, which made the first attempt toward copyright
universalization, while promoting the commercial monopoly in the author's name, the one who's
interests was served was in the 19th century the publisher, and today the author's employer,
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of course, while inhibiting the others' access to such writings, and therefore
paradoxically restricts their social significance. 139
assignee, or licensee. From. the perspective of a qui pro quo in copyright Bogulslavsky's words
might contain some truth, when he argued that the Convention was established "in the interests
of publishing and other companies.• M. M. Boguslavsky, "Copyright in International Relations:
International Protection of Literary and Scientific Works" (trans. N. Poulet), Catterns, Sidney,
1979, at 190.
139.The originally public censorship is now exercised by the private owner, often
inhibiting others' cultural and political access to 'their' works. Perhaps in this sense, Gordon
speaks about a "balkanization" of this issue. "Towards a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms
of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship", in 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1009, 1032-49
(1990). The complete control of the copyright holder to perform her work, as a specific form
of private censorship is discussed also by Patterson, Copyright Overextended at 393.
The corporate owner-the prominent copyright holder--exercises a truly effective
censorship: it has the power to decide what, when and in which way the work will be
disseminated. When "The New York Times" tells its readers that they will find inside •All the
News That's Fit to Print", that is a sly consequence of private censorship. (There is of course
the possibility that the government itself could control its copyrighted items. However, the
Supreme Court ruled against a tax limited just to the press, exempting other media, because it
"raises concerns about censorship of critical information and opinion.• Leathers v. Medlock,
113 L. Ed. 2d 494, 111 S.Ct. 1438 (1991))
The American "fair use" doctrine, it might be described originating as a policy
"promoting the diffusion of ideas." "Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of
Antitrust Standards and First Amendment Values• 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1289, 1306 (1991). (Until
1976 the fair use doctrine was a case law creation, and before the 1980s, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in only two case implicating this doctrine. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F .2d
532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom. Columbia
Broadcast Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) and Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S.
376 (1975). W. W. Fisher ill, "Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine" 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1661,
1663 (1988).)
•An expanded fair use doctrine can be used to limit the inherent ability of television
broadcasters to control and limit access to their works through the protections granted by the
copyright laws." S. S. Zimmermann, "A Regulatory Theory of Copyright: Avoiding a First
Amendment Conflict", in 35 Emory L.J. 163, 189, (1986).
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Consequently, even if the technical legal and social status of today's
writings remains the same, it has gained in fact a host of new aspects140
The seemingly endless discussion about the goals of the American Copyright Clause
might also be explained as an effort to find ways to elude private censorship. In numerous cases
judges have emphasired that ultimately the goal of the Copyright Clause--and Act-is to serve
the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and other arts. See,
International News Serv. v. As.5oclated Pres.s, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
This goal, if real, does not contradict the commercial character of the Copyright Clause
and Act. It merely provides a justification for government regulation of this market,
acknowledging its failure as a free competitive one.
140

In their recent book, L. R. Paterson, and S. W. Lindberg, ("The Nature of Copyright:
A Law of Users' Rights" Athens: Georgia U.P. 1991 [reviewed by, Loren, L. P. "1992 Survey
of Books Relating to the Law; VII. Tort and Commercial Law: The Nature of Copyright: A Law
of Users' Rights" in 990 Mich. L. Rev. 1624 (1992), and "Recent publication: The nature of
Copyright: A Law of Users' Rights" in 106 Harv. L. Rev. 975 (1993)]) address different
interpretations of American copyright law. They propose another reading of the law, as a matter
of policy choices-- a statutory grant of a "limited monopoly designed to maximize the
distribution of information", also providing "reasonable rights" for its users (p.14).
•

Facing a "public myth" based on "philosophical precepts of Hohfeld, Hegel, Locke
(discussed in J. Hughes, "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property", in 77 Geo. L. J. 287 (1988),
L. J. Lacey, "Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights", in 1989 Duke L.J. 1532, Yen, Restoring
the Natural Law), and opposing the economic analyses of copyright law (augmented in S.
Breyer, "The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs", 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970), W. J. Gordon, "Fair Use as Market
Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors", 82
Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982), J. Cirace, "When Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted for
Purposes Other than Profit or Sale Constitute Fair Use? An Economic Analysis of the Sony
Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases", in 28 St. Louis U. L. J. 647 (1984), Fisher,
Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 1698-1744; W. M. Landes, R. A. Posner, "An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law", in 18 J. Legal Stud. 325 (1989), J. Litman, "Copyright as Myth",
53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 235 (1991)), they deal with a recurrent issue: copyright as a product of the
community of industries it affects. Recently these particular aspects of "writings"' regime under
the copyright law were discussed in A. R. Miller, "Copyright Protection For Computer
Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since Contu?" in 106
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generated by new commercial interests, with new and more wide-ranging aims
and powers. Because .of the special configuration141 of musical works, and
their a distinctive assortment of "copy rights", they serve the best to support my
opinion regarding current national copyright policies.

Harv. L. Rev. 9n (1993), and C. H. Settlemeyer ID, "Between Thought and Possession:
Artists' 'Moral Rights' and Public Access to Creative Works", in 81 Geo. L. J. 2291 (1993).
141

In the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, for example, musical works, which are already
copyright subject matter--§ 102 (a)(2)-, if performed and recorded become new copyright
subject matter: sound recordings- §102 (a)(7), and also newly exist as "derivative works"--§101.
•

A movie soundtrack is considered a literary work at both the national and international
levels, but the same recorded music released as a sound recording will be treated differently,
under both domestic and international regimes. See N. Turkewitz, •Authors' Rights Are Dead"
38 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 41, 44, (1990) Cheteinafter, Turkewitz, Authors' Rights].
With respect to producers of sound recordings, in Europe they hold neighboring rights
even if they have or not copyright as such in sound recordings. See Council of Europe. Human
Rights. Mass Media Files no. 5. Intellectual Property Rights and Cable Distribution of
Television Programs. Strasbourg 1983, 6-8. The English producers, and those whose domestic
laws are influenced by U.K. statutes have copyright in sound recordings, see P. Stone,
"Copyright Law in the United Kingdom and the European Community". The Athlone Press,
London, 1990, at 27 [hereinafter Stone, Copyright Law]; P. Groves, "Copyright & Designs
Law. A Question of Balance. The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988", Graham &
Trotman, London, 1991, 31; Sterling, Copyright Law at 414.
The Cyprus Copyright Law, for example, was identical to the 1911 U.K. Copyright Act
until 1978 when a domestic law influenced by the U.K. law came into force. See A. C.
Evangelou, "Intellectual Property Law" 29 Cyprus L. Rev. 4644, 4646 (1990).
This kind of copyright, in both sound recordings and broadcast transmissions, is called
"entrepreneurial copyright," by W. R. Cornish in "Intellectual Property", London, 19s1"300.
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B. AMERIGAN COPYRIGHTED MUSIC

Musical works have been subject to copyright under American law since
1831 142 • Authors have been vested with all the exclusive rights provided in
each version of the copyright statute 143 •
When a composer doesn't work for hire 144 , and theoretically therefore,
is the holder of all statutory rights, he actually enjoys a far less powerful
142

• In 1831 the first general revision of the original act of 1790 occurred. With the Act of
February 3, 21st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 Stat. 436, the Copyright Act extended its protection to
musical compositions. See Latman's Copyright at 7.
143

• The exclusive rights in copyrighted works under 1976 Act U.S.C. are the following:
(1) to reproduce it in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon it;
(3) to distribute its copies or phonorecords to the public by sale-or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4)in the case of literary, musical (..• )works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical( ... ) works, to display it publicly.
144

In the most common circumstances, the producer of television programs and films retains
a composer to write the music for the production. (E.g., Tr. 3303). In the typical "composerfor-hire" agreement, the composer is required to perform various service in addition to
composing. These includes orchestration, conducting, hiring of musicians and spotting. (e.g.,
AX 312 at 23) Under such "composer-for-hire" contracts, the producer commonly arranges for
the performance rights to be assigned to its own in-house publishing subsidiary or affiliate. Thus
the publisher typically retains the copyright and the right directly to license the performance
of the muSic, and "the composer and publisher share equally in performance fees." (Tr. 565-66,
1433, 1615-16, 3300-02, 3463-66; AX310 at 41-43, 46-48 & Exh. 1 at P 3(h); AX 312 at 1113; AX 358 & DX 857, Tab 1 at 16-21; AX 345 & DX 858, Tab 2 at 1802-05; AX 351 &
DX861 at 87-88.) United States of America v. American Society pf Composers, Authors and
Publishers, Civ. 13-95 (WCC) S.D.N.Y.,.1993, Copy. L. Rep. (CCII) P27,088; 1993-1 Trade
Cas. (CCII) P70,153.
•
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position than all other authors. In many ways- she is just a legal smoke screen
for the entertainment industry, playing the role of its totem (in the freudian
sense145), as well as that of a pedestal for American celebrities. 146

a) THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE THE MUSIC IN

PHONORECORDS AND TO AUTHORIZE SOUND
RECORDINGS

Prior to the 1909 Act, composers had no rights in phonorecords 147•

145

S. Freud, "Totem und Tabu" [authorized English translation with introduction by Brill,
A.A., "Totem and Taboo; Resemblances Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics"], Moffat,
Yard and Co., NY, 1918.
•

146

• These celebrities include those mentioned in C. Vinzant, "How Celebrities Cost You,
the Little Guy, Big Bucks Through the Fabulousness-Added Tax~, Spy, February 1994, 35-40.

The role of the musical composer in present American society is a product and a cause
of the influence of the North American pop-culture across the world. See e.g., J. Rockwell,
"The New Colossus: American Culture as Power Export", NY Times, January 30, 1994, sect.
2, at 1.
147 •

The 1909 copyright revision gave "some protection to the composers of underlying
works in order to vitiate part of the harshness of White-Smith." White-Smith Music
Publishing Co., v. Apollo Co. (209 U.S. 1, 28 S.Ct. 319, 52 L.ed. 655 (1908)) which held
"that piano rolls were not copies of the underlying musical composition they caused a piano
player to reproduce, because piano rolls could not be read or deciphered by the naked eye."
Miller and Davis, Intellectual Property, at 313.
musi~

an eco-esc pendulum of copyright

------------------~-----------------------------

61
Under the 1909 legislation, composers gained the exclusive right to authorize the
production of a special kind of copy of his music-the phcmorecord. If it were
just a copy in another medium of the musical composition, the sound recorded
in it would soon be statutorily treated as an independently copyrighted subject
matter148 , and at the same time, a derivative work of the underlying musical
composition.
A sound recording (as treated by the 1976 Act), is the merged product

between recording technology, musical performance and the underlying music,
or otherwise the result of an affixation of captured or recaptured sound of the
performed music 149• In terms of the composer's legal interest, a second sound

148

In the music industry, Neil Turkewitz notices, "the record company invests in the
performances of musical compositions of authors and creates a new and original work," -a
phonorecord. The sale of that end product "produces benefits for all the creative parties--the
author of the musical composition, the performers, musicians, sound engineers, etc."
•

Accordingly, the author concludes that "to ensure adequate compensation for all the
parties, it is essential that record companies are able to protect their works for at least fifty years
and to make decisions about how to control the distribution of their works to the public."
Authors' Rights, 43.
149

About the music industry--including music publishing and sound recording--, see D. E.
Biederman, E. P. Pierson, M. E. Silfen, J. A. Glasser, R. P. Berry, "Law and Business of the
Entertainment Industries" 2nd ed. PRAEGER, NY, 1992, 383-512.
•
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recording guarantees only statutory royalties150 : once he authorizes the first
fixation of her music in a phonorecord (again as treated by the 1976 Act), he
accepts the resulting compulsory license. However, a composer who has at least
some right in a new subject matter-the phonorecord--can be expected to be less

150

• When the Court decided in White-Smith that piano rolls "constituted merely parts of
devices for mechanically performing the music", the seeds of the composer's compulsory license
were planted.

The legal concept of such a license was introduced by the 1909 Copyright Act revision.
"Because of what seemed at the time a well-grounded fear of monopolistic control of music for
recording purposes, Congress qualified the right ·of mechanical control by providing in
subsection (e) of Section l that if the copyright proprietor himself used or sanctioned the use of
his composition in this way, any other person was free to do so upon paying a royalty of two
cents for each part (each roll or record) manufactured." Latman's Copyright at 206.
The 1976 Copyright Act also provides a limitation in the case of recording nondramatic
musical works for commercial purposes in § 115: "Scope of exclusive rights in nondramatic
musical works: Compulsory license for marketing and distributing phonorecords." The
compulsory license concerns any kind of mechanical reproduction, by record, cassette, or
compact disc or any future material fixation.
The royalty rate was, in the 1980s, five cents per composition per recording, or .95 cent
per minute of playing time, whichever is greater. 37 C.F.R. @ 115(c) (1982). Although the
Copyright Act of 1976 indicates that the royalty rate is "two and three-fourth cents, or one-half
of one cent per minute of playing time of fraction thereof,• 17 U.S.C. @ 115(c) (2) (1982), this
rate has been increased administratively several times under the authority of 17 U.S.C.@ 804
(a)(2)(B) (1982). For details, see S. L. Bach, "Music Recording, Publishing, and Compulsory
Licenses: Toward a Consistent Copyright Law". 14 Hofstra L. Rev. 379, 380, (1986). See alsQ,
Henn, "The Compulsory License Provisions of the United States Copyright Law" (1956),
reprinted in 2 Studies on Copyright--Arthur Fisher Memorial Edition 877 (1963); Blaisdell,
"Economic Aspects of the Compulsory License in the Copyright Law" (1958), reprinted id.,
937.
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likely to disturb commerce within a rapidly evolving music industry151 • (Or,
differently expressed, and perhaps more methaphisically, the composer's royalty
was granted anticipating a far more lucrative market in the sound
recording152 .)
This expansion of copyright subject matter--even if accompanied by a less
expansive right in it by the original authorial composer--represented the creation

151

• •congress adopted this compromise position between White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v.
Apollo Co, 209 U.S. 1, 28 S.Ct. 319, 52 L.Ed. 655 (1908) and full copyrightability", Miller
and Davis wrote, as an ameliorative device against totally control of production by the composer
and the domination of the market by the company which at that time effectively monopolized
the recording market. Intellectual Property, at 314.

152 •

Usually, commentators and courts ( e.g., Sony Corporation of America v. City
Studios) assume that the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in
technology, that the invention of a new form of copying equipment gave rise to a new need for
copyright protection. For example, the development and marketing of player pianos and
perforated rolls of music determined the creation of the new exclusive right over the production
of such copies, and White-Smith preceded the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909.
Supposing this to be true, why do the new statutory rights, instead of benefiting the genuine
author, created entirely new copyright owners, and/or instead of going to individual creators,
are in fact overextended to companies and other non-creative commercial enterprises?
It is very important for the purpose of this paper to realize that a recorded performance-a sound recording-- is better protected than the original music. While anybody can perform and
record previously recorded music, upon payment of statutory fees, without any fear that a
recognizable product constitutes infringement of the music, a re-recording of an original album
will constitute infringement of the copyright owner's right in the first sound recording as long
as "the final product [is] 'recognizable' as the same performance as recorded in the original."
United States v. Taxe, 380 F.Supp.1015, 184 U.S.P.Q. 7(C.D. Cal. 1974) aff'd, 540 F.2d
961, 192 U.S.P.Q. 204 (9th Cir.1976). That is slavish performance of a composition that is
already recorded is free for the taking-compulsory licenses being paid--but a slavish recording
of an existing sound recording (the product of entrepreneurial and technological resources, and
not artistic creativity) is forbidden.
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of a new monopoly for the benefit of a new class of copyright holders: the
music-businessmen, which has encouraged the music industry in general, but not
necessarily the individual author153 , who usually works for a more limited
remuneration. What this legislation accomplished was to grant a very powerful
153

At the risk of being redundant, I repeat that the vast majority of creators are corporate
employees.
•

What before 1909 wasn't even addressed by U.S. copyright statutes-the employed
"author"-, with the 1909 Act became a "controversial innovation", coming a few years after
the initial judicial "doctrine of works made for hire", and with the 1976 Act the exception
changed into the rule.
Jaszi considered this fact (Toward a Theory of Copyright at 487), as a departure from
copyright ideology. I would disagree with him because copyright regulation has never been truly
a protection of "Romantic authorship," but, basically, a commercial regulation. If the copyright
monopoly has been accepted to protect almost any kind of non-functional expression, why is an
emotional defense- the necessity for a "creative incentive"-, advanced to protect the naked
entrepreneurial .interest, when the employed· author is treated as any other employee. (Related
with this background I would like to advance the idea that the author is generally regarded as
an •intellectual worker. • I find this astonishing and close to inexplicable, explained only by the
inherent conflict these entrepreneurs face: proud members of a free market economy, they exist
only through massive government intervention!)
I have not discussed here the conditions of copyrightability, but in the case of a sound
recording it is interesting to see that originality may proceed from the performer's unique
contribution or the producer's technical employees, or both. Neither party has a copyright
interest under American law. Another perspective which emphasizes the producer's and
performer's authorship, on the copyrightable elements of sound recording, appears in H.R.REP.
NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in 1976 U.S. COD~ CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5659, 5669; also H. REP. NO. 487, 92D Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1566, 1570.
I still wonder why a performance which is not copyrightable, recorded, has as a result
copyright subject matter--the sound recording. The only reasonable answer is that copyright is
commercial protection which was corrupted by the false argumentation of "authorial protection
and incentives for creation" and, which in the last instance is justified only by the public interest
in dissemination of information.
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commercial monopoly--in particular sound recordings-, more extraordinary than
any other legal protection ordinarily enjoyed by ,a class of mere entrepreneurs.
(An incentive designed to motivate art has no justification here any more than

for a Texas farmer's motivation to raise cattle, for example: Both 'investors'
seek to procure an identical benefit, or rent in economic terms. The most
,
obvious and perhaps only difference between musical art and agriculture from
the point of view of the ordinary entrepreneur is that after aircraft, American
musical and other entertainment art is the most heavily and successfully
exported. 154)
Assuming that commerce in music demands a special monopoly, different
from agricultural subsidies, for instance, at least "the evil ought not to last a day
longer than is necessary" for its purposes 155 , and not simply as long as appear
politically possible to secure the music-businessmen the most outrageously
154

•

See Rockwell, The New Colossus.

155

• However, commentators cannot help complaining about the inequitable treatment suffered
by sound recording companies as copyright holders. "The Copyright Act affords less protection
to sound recordings ( ... ) than to written musical works and other kinds of copyright works.
Musical score copyright owners have the exclusive right to perform and reproduce their work.
Sound recordings copyright owners hold no corresponding right of exclusive performance.
Similarly, sound recording copyright holders' exclusive right of reproduction is narrower than
the corresponding right granted to musical score copyright holders." L. Benjamin, "Tuning Up
the Copyright Act: Substantial Similarity and Sound Recording Protection", 73 Minn. L. Rev.
1175' 1175 (1989).
.
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profitable return on their investment156• But, of course, that is not the case and
these entrepreneurs receive a benefit only justifiable if they were, in fact
authors, supplying on more example to interpret the copyright statute, not as a
securing authors' rights, but as a pure commercial reglementation157 •

b) THE MUSIC PERFORMING RIGHT AND ITS
EXPLOITATION

In the process of promoting and endorsing desirable copyright regulation,
the American music industry succeeded not only in subverting the individual
copyright owner, but it also has alienated another copyright right from the

156

• Ironically, almost every American commentator sympathizes with the copyright owners
of sound recordings in comparison with other owners. They do not seem to understand that even
if, as merchants, producers have some claim to their status they have no moral claim to such a
powerful monopoly to the natural rights of individual author.

157

• The reason for the 1972 statutory revision was the fact that "rival manufacturers would
simply obtain masters or copies of the authorized producer's phonorecords and proceed to
reproduce and sell pirated copies(... ) paying nothing to anyone.• Miller and Davis added that
"recognizing this untenable situation, Congress finally granted record companies a copyright in
their phonorecords in 1972 and empowered them to bring infringement actions against pirates."
Intellectual Property, at 315.
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composer-the performing right158 • While the owner of copyright in a sound
recording does not possess a statutory right of performance159, the composer
is only theoretically more privileged.
The performance right in a musical composition, "the most important of
the performance rights," 160 long described as problematic due to private
158

• Section l(e) of the 1909 Copyright Act gave the owner of the copyright of a musical
composition the exclusive right to perform it publicly for profit. Under this provision there are
three elements of a cause of action for infringement of the "performing rights" by or in
connection with motion pictures, radio, and television: there must be a "performance" of the
copyrighted work, the performance must be "public,• and "for profit."

As a result of the 1947 amendment of @ l(e) of the Copypght Act the owner of a
copyright for music has the exclusive right to make any arrangement or setting of the
composition or melody for the purpose of public performance for profit and also for the purpose
of printing, reprinting, publishing, copying, and vending the copyrighted composition. But this
provision did not give the copyright owner the exclusive right to make an arrangement of the
music for the purpose of making a record. 23 A.L.R. 2d 244, *2.
159

Under§ 106 (1)(2)(3) and (4) the owner of the copyright has no performing right in his
sound recording.
•

§114. Scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings, in 1976 Act. Latrnan, Copyright for
the Nineties. Statutory Appendix, at 27.
For a doctrinal analyses, Meyers, "Sound Recordings and the New Copyright Act" 22
N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rev. 573 (1977); Lang, "Performing and the Right of the Performing Artist",
21 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 69 (1974); Nimmer, Cases and Materials on Copyright
206-39; H. G. Henn, "Henn on Copyright Law. A Practitioner's Guide", (3d ed), 1991, p. 205.

160

•

Nimmer, Cases and Materials on Copyright, at 237.

For a new approach to performance rights (which have been in existence since the 1897
amendment to the Copyright Act), as a distinct form of neo-copyright--the performance
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enforcement and policing difficulties 161 , does not actually belong any more to
the composer, but to abstract entities, such as the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers, ASCAP. 162 (ASCAP has always been
presented as an immanently contemporary and modem way to protect
copyrighted compositions.)
When copyright collectivization began, the movement was considered by
commentators as well as its initiators as progressive and exclusively in the
interest of authors, designed to maximize their commercial benefit. The
copyrighted musical work has often appeared not economically feasible for

copyright-- defined as "a private copyright use tax,• see Paterson, Copyright Overextended, 393-

4.
161

• "Musical works, however, by their very nature may be performed on such an extensive
basis as to render it impossible for individual composers and publishers to enforce effectively
their performance rights on an individual basis. " id.

162

In order to take full advantage of the new statutory right, the performing right, "a group
of prominent popular composers-among them Victor Herbert and John Philip Sousa-• formed
the "first performing rights organization in the United States. The purpose of the organization
was to serve as clearinghouse for performing-rights licensing (thereby reducing the cost of
individual licensing) and an agency to monitor performances and police infringements. With the
aid of their able and dedicated ~ttomey, Nathan Bur.kan, ASCAP embarked on a litigation
campaign to establish their rights." Latman, Copyright for the Nineties, at 521.
•

On ASCAP' s purpose and history, see International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855
F. 2d 375, 376 n.I (7th Cir. 1988).
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copyright holders "to monitor and obtain payment for each such use. "163
Composers, as.copyright owners, were convinced that collective societies would
overcome this difficulty. By providing centralized administration, more
transactions would occur at lower costs 164 .and by pricing jointly, collective
action would lead to potential market power.
Therefore, together with judicial cooperation, they considered it requisite
for composers to form umbrella associations and pool their resources in order
to effectively guard against unauthorized use of their compositions. 165 Their
societies 166 have succeeded to exercise so "aggressively" their performance
163

S. M. Besen, S. N. Kirby, S. C. Salop, "An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Collectives," 78 Va. L. Rev. 383, 383, (1992) [hereinafter, An Economic Analysis].
164

•

On the rationale for an institutionalized and bureaucratic collective administration versus
a personalized administration of owners rights see, An Economic Analysis, p. 384: "Collective
administration of the copyrights of a group of owners increases production efficiency when its
cost is lower than that of administrating the copyrights of all possible subsets of the same group
of owners." ( I use these authors' opinions taking into account their recognition that there is a
conflict between their analysis and the fact that these are instances in which it is relatively easy
for users to obtain licenses directly from authors. However, except for the· situation of movie
producers, virtually all other music users license the performing right through ASCAP.)
•

165 • This

stereotype rationale is common place in many cases.
See, for instance Board
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, (W .D.
Ok. 1982) 546 F. Sopp. 1276; 1982-2 Tnlde Cas. (CCH) P64, 943, 943 (1982).
166

Nimmer calls them "performing rights societies", in An Economic Analysis, they are
called "copyright collectives," and G. W. G. Kamell, "collecting societies" in "Collecting
Societies in Music", Collecting Societies in the Music Business ( D. Peeperkom, C. van Rij,
D. Lester, L. Faulder, eds), MAKLU Publishers, Apeldoom/Netherlands--Antwerpen/Belgium,
1989, 15-21.
•
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right that, apparently, it might not even be subject to the doctrine of fair use
(which is supposed to be available "regardless of the type of work
involved" 167).
When ASCAP was created perhaps both, music publishers and composers
imagined that they had truly collective interests, perhaps a fraternal sense 168 ,
and that they could equally control their exploitation. After only a few decades,
however, ASCAP was subjected to the terms of a series of consent decrees
which provide that its members have no individual economic powers upon
acceptance of member-status in ASCAP169 :
1. Its role as an intermediary between members and user is in fact fluid:

when it is a question of a direct loss, such loss falls upon its members, because

167

•

Paterson, Copyright Overextended at 39.

168

• In Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, 180 F. Supp. 322, 325; 1959 Trade Cas. (CCH)
P69,543; 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 34, (S.D.N.Y. 1959), the 33 composers-plaintiffs alleged that
the other major American collective society, Broadcast Music, Inc.,(BMI) is "wholly owned
by radio and television broadcasting companies. BMI is engaged primarily in the acquisition and
licensing of performance rights in musical compositions."
169

About ASCAP's acquisition of performance rights in musical compositions that have
been synchronized with motion pictures, see United States v. ASCAP, 1950-51 Trade Cas.
(CCH) P62, 595, at 63,752 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Another consequence of ASCAP's membership
is that its members must grant such rights to motion picture producers simultaneously with
synchronization rights., i.e., the rights to record the music in the sound track. See, AldenRochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)
•
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ASCAP is only an agent, "the middle-man between the songwriter and the
user" --effectively a collection agency, or "co-operative society." 170 When it is
a question of recovery of damages, the Second Circuit has stated that such funds
"would go to the society," and the "plaintiffs were necessary parties merely
because they hold their respective causes of action in trust for the society. " 171 1
2. Sometimes, ASCAP's conduct has a negative impact on its members
interests. For instance, in a recent infringement case involving ASCAP's
members' performance rights, the defense was that "plaintiffs are estopped from
claiming infringement because ASCAP allegedly violated a consent decree
issued by the Southern District of New York in United States v. American
Society of Composers, Authors, and.Publishers. "1'.2
170 •

See Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, where a loss is supported by ASCAP's members
rather than by the agent itself.
171

..

See, e.g., Buck v. Elm Lodge, Inc., 83 F.2d 201, 202 (2d Cir. 1936). There are many
cases where the vindication of the right of public performance of members' songs was brought
in the name of ASCAP, e.g. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Reality Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); JewellLaSalle Reality Co. v. Buck, 283 U.S. 202 (1931).
•

172

• Trade Reg. Rep.(CCH) P 62.595 (S.D.N.Y. March 14, 1950). The district court refused
to address the estoppel argument or to add ASCAP as a party in the case, concluding that any
dispute between defendant-infringer and ASCAP should be brought as a separate suit. Bourne
Co., Henry Mancini, d/b/a Northridge Music Co., SBK Robbins Catalog, Inc., v. Hunter
Country Club, Inc., 990 F.2d 934; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P27,079; 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
P70,179; 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 546 (7th. Cir. 1993). The court's attitude in rejecting
the defendant's claim against ASCAP in this case confirms once more that ASCAP's and its
members' interests diverge, and maybe, even conflict. One is left to wonder ASCAP real
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3. ASCAP's members agree to an "impersonal"173 determination of the
terms of the licenses and the rates to be charged. "Individual members do not
pass upon, approve, ratify or object to license terms agreed to by the
Board. " 174 ASCAP determines the work's license fee and the rate its member
will share from the total fund, and ASCAP has the final decision subject to
judicial review in cases of disagreement between it and its members. 175
4. Even though for over fifty years, now, ASCAP was required to allow
its members to have some economic power to negotiate outside ASCAP, many
members, like the thirty three composers-plaintiffs in Schwartz, have not
granted a single license since they became ASCAP members, although they
possess this theoretical equal right to grant non-exclusive licenses. 176 The
interest is if not that of its members!
173

•

174.

ASCAP's Board of Directors decides these problems. Schwartz, 180 F. Supp. 322, 330.
id.

175

• In United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) petitioner Karmen--ajingle writer-, raised the issue of federal over state court
jurisdiction in a matter concerning the value weighted by the ASCAP's Board of Directors for
jingles. The court ruled for defendant.
176

Schwartz, 180 F. Supp. 322, 332: "While the 1941 decree voided the exclusive
licensing right in AS CAP, the fact is ( ...) that no plaintiff granted nondramatic public
performance licenses." Plaintiffs in their interrogatories categorically stated: "The license for
nondramatic performance for profit for all compositions... have, since 1940, been issued by
ASCAP."
•
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Board of Directors controls and disposes of all funds received, and determines
the net amount to be distributed among the members. ASCAP members under
the Articles of Association by which they are bound177 have executed
agreements which unequivocally transfer to ASCAP a nonexclusive right to
license public performances for profit of their compositions. In practice then, it
is from ASCAP alone, which negotiates the licenses' fees, that fellow members
receive royalties in an amount ,determined and controlled by ASCAP178 •
ASCAP is hardly a fraternal organization, but a big business and courts have
noted that "even were it accepted that ASCAP is a 'cooperative society' which
renders services exclusively in the interests of its members, this would 'not
remove its activities from the sphere of business 179 ." 180
5. What makes the composer's status even more puzzling is that even if
ASCAP members resigned, while it would terminate all existing assignments,
the resignation would be subject to certain rights or obligations existing between

177
178

•

Gem Music Corp. v. Taylor, 294 N.Y. 34, 38, 60 N.E.2d 196, 198 (1945).

•

id.

179
•

American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943).

180

Schwartz, 180 F. Supp. 322, 331.

•
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ASCAP and its licensees. Specifically ASC~ would continue to have the right
to grant nonexclusive licenses in a resigned writer's composition as long as his
publishers and collaborators remained members of ASCAP. 181 One must
wonder: If a maximization of profit results due to the existence of such
collective societies, whose interest is protected besides the collectives own
interest as a separate entity?182 .
6. It seems that the composer's status in this situation, is similar to that of
18th century English authors, who were tolerated in order to justify for
publishers benefits of the book-business. First of all, they seem to have no.
chance to exploit their copyright monopoly as outsiders from collective societies.
Secondly, inside the collective societies, as members, they have a disadvantaged
status in comparison with ASCAP' s music-businessmen members--the music
publishers:
On one side, the net royalty amount, which ASCAP designates for its
members, is divided in equal shares between composers and publishers by the

.,

'

'

181
182

•

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Taylor, 10 Misc:2d 9, 55 N. Y.S.2d 94 (S.Ct.N. Y. 1945).

•

It is clear, at least that the interest in question is a commercial one.
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Board of Directors. 183 On the other side, the large majority of publishing
contracts are concluded in fact with ASCAP publisher houses 184 • Thus,
ASCAP' s composers depend economically upon their publishers, their assignees.
In theory this position obliges ASCAP's publishing houses to exploit ¢.eir comembers' works in good faith for their mutual benefit185 , because everything
depends on this exploitation. In reality, as plaintiffs in Schwartz v. BMI
proved 186 , "some publishers, who were ASCAP houses, organized BMI
companies and although in theory functioning separately, in fact, because of
special concessions granted by BMI to the publishers, refrained from promoting
non-BMI music or curtailed its exploitation. "187

183

The amount to be distributed is divided into two equal parts: one for allocation among
publisher members and the other for allocation among writer members. Articles of Association
of ASCAP, Article XV.
•

184

• In Schwartz the plaintiffs had entered into agreements with 300 music publishers who
were also ASCAP members. The agreements covered approximately 5,800 of the 7,000
compositions written by plaintiffs.

185

186

•

Broadcast Music v. Taylor, see supra note no. 180.

•

Plaintiffs identified a number of firms engaged in this practice.

187

• In Schwartz plaintiffs charged that music publishers with whom they had contracts were
induced by subsidies, restrictive covenants, incentive payments and other devices including
payments of salaries of publishers' employees, to refrain from publishing and exploiting
plaintiffs' songs, and that "these activities were all for the purpose" of discrimination in favor
of BMI songs. They also alleged that concessions were granted by BMI. Schwartz, 180 F.
Supp. 322, 335.
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Assuming that composers cannot efficiently protect their performance
rights, this is certainly relevant for the establishment of ASCAP, but only or at
least mostly with respect to the unique situation in which composers' copyright
interests are the issue. Nevertheless, whether it is ASCAP, Bl.\fi188 or other
similar so-called non-profit organizations, one can hardly say that they routinely
or even often act for the benefit of their members' individual interests. 189

188

The public performing rights to most copyrighted musical works are licensed by two
major performing rights societies ASCAP and BMI (Broadcast Music, Inc.) See, Nimmer on
Copyright, §8.19; S. Shemel, & M. Krasilovsky, "This Business of Music" (rev. ed. 1977), at
163.
While ASCAP boasts a repertory of over 3 million compositions, BMI gloats over a
million of them. Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); J. M. Fujitani, "Controlling the Market Power of Performing Rights Societies: an
Administrative Substitute for Antitrust Regulation" 72 Calif. L. Rev. 103, (1984).
On behalf "of its more than 50,000 members [in United States of America v. American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (S.D.N.Y. 1993), this number is given as
40,000], ASCAP licenses thousands of radio and television stations, restaurants, nightclubs,
concert halls, and other establishments whose owners desire to perform copyrighted musical
compositions." Pedrosillo Music v. Radio Musical Inc. and Thomas Carrasquillo, 815
F.Supp. 511; 27 U.S.P.Q. 2D (BNA) 1153 (D.P.R. 1993).
BMI, a nonprofit corporation owned by members of the broadcasting industry--CBS was
among the broadcasters who formed BMI-- was organized in 1939, and affiliated in 1979 some
10,000 publishing companies and 20,000 authors and composers, operating in the same manner
as ASCAP.
189 •

Under fiduciary law, ASCAP and any other collective society, must act on behalf of its
members. One might say that an elite and a riffraff are reduced to a common denominator. In
this act of membership, hardly a matter of free choice where the collective acts for everybody,
it appears very progressive per se, but is very perverse in fact. It masks an oppressive burden
upon the individual creator, who has to sustain not only his business partners, her publishers,
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Depriving their members of performance rights, and exercising them
autonomously through nonexclusive licenses of those rights, collective societies
emerge as the reification of the relationship between the-individual composer and
his abstract intermediary. This reification has as a result the substitution, for
human uniqueness, of a bureaucratic mechanism which pretends to represent the
best interests of the author.
In fact, however this reification is deceptive and false for it would be

accurate only if the members of collective societies had been only individual
composers. But collective societies operating in the music industry190 join
composers,

pu~lishing

houses, members of broadcasting industries, individuals

but also his benefactor, the collective society.
"The manner in which performing rights societies operate is a most complex and
voluminous subject raising problems primarily of an antitrust rather than copyright nature."
Nimmer on Copyright, §8.19. It is astonishing, but not unusual, for the legal technician like
Nimmer to avoid this problem 'by such a definitional leap, for collective societies are nothing
if not purely, entirely, and only, a creature of the copyright regime which framed and sustained
them. Also Sobel, "The Music Business and the Sherman Act: An Analysis of the 'Economic
Realities' of Blanket Licensing," 3 Loyala Ent. L. J. 1, 3-4 (1983); Timberg, "The·Antitrust
Aspects of Merchandising Modem Music: The ASCAP Consent Judgment of 1950, • 19 J. Law
& Contemp. Probs. 294, 298 (1954).
190

Almost every domestic copyrighted composition is in the repertory either of ASCAP,
with a total, in 1979, of three million compositions, or of BMI, with one million.
•
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and corporations 191 , indeed almost anybody meaningfully involved in the
commerce of music.
While the Copyright Clause, represents government intervention in this
commercial area, the collective societies represent a private bureaucratic
intervention, under the rubric of the author's interests. However, ASCAP and
other similar organizations are the primary beneficiaries of this interventionism.
On one hand, the users have an all-or-nothing choice192 in choosing to accept
the collective's fee schedule, and on the other hand, its members are in the same

191

One might say, in other words, that the act of joining intellectual workers and their
exploiters together is another example of how capitalism goes on its triumphant march.
192

•

ASCAP through its licensing department grants performance licenses to users of music.
They are of two kinds: (1) a blanket license, which is the type generally issued; and (2) a
program license. The terms of the licenses and the rates to be charged are decided by ASCAP's
Board of Directors. Individual members do not pass upon, approve, ratify or reject terms agreed
to by the Board.
•

All royalties and license fees collected by ASCAP are pooled in a common fund.
Controls over and disposition of all funds received is vested in the Board of Directors. The funds
are first disbursed to meet operating expenses and payments owed to affiliated foreign societies.
Upon payment of the foregoing plus reserves which may be established, the net amount
remaining is distributed among the members upon order of the Board of Directors. The amount
to be distributed is divided into two equal parts: one for allocation among publisher members
and the other for allocation among writers members. See, for details, Articles of Association of
ASCAP, Article XIV and XV.
For a recent clise see, e.g. United States of America v. American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers, Civ. 13-95 (WCC), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7058. May
1993, S.D.N. Y.
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situation are having no choice concerning their remuneration and other interests.
While its members retain the right to individually license public performance,
even if ASCAP grants a nonexclusive license, a member has almost never
competed with it. Created as a common agent193 to minimalize the license's
cost, by its own existence, ASCAP discourages users from licenses with
individual members 194 •
The remarkable success and effective monopolies enjoyed by performing
collective societies makes it more obvious as nothing else that copyright was and
remains a commercial regulation of a failed free market. This bald assertion
receives considerable support from the case law involving the relations between
collective societies and their users.

193

On ASCAP as agent, see, e.g. Knight Kitchen Music, v. John J. Pineau, Civ. No.
92-0169-B, 149 Bankr. 239; Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P75,097; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) I"l.7, 052;
•

23 Banlcr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1427.
The 2d circuit Court of Appeal, however, has recognized that ASCAP is not a mere
agency nor a single conduit for its members, Buck v. Ehn Lodge.
194

• A recent suit against ASCAP and BMI, decided in October 1992, at the district court
level, contesting their dominant position in the music market, is International Show Car
Association v. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers, and Broadcast
Music, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1308; 1992 U.S. Dist. 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P70, 056.
(E.D.Mic. 1992)
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In Broadcast Music195 one of the three national commercial television

networks-CBS™-sued the two major collective societies in the music
industry on the ground that the blanket license system constituted illegal prices
under antitrust law. 197 CBS was, of course, the world's largest manufacturer
and seller of records and tapes 1.98 and also a leading music publisher, with
publishing subsidiaries affiliated both ASCAP199 and BMI. Justice White held,
in his majority opinion200 , contrary to CBS' claim, that the blanket license is

195

• Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. l; 99 S. Ct. 1551
(1979). See also, P. Areeda, "Antitrust Analysis. Problems, Text, Cases" Little Brown, Boston,
Toronto (3d. ed. 456-66), 4th ed. 232-242.
196

•

It supplies programs to approximately 200 affiliated stations telecasting approximately

7,500 network programs per year.
197

However, CBS would have preferred that ASCAP make all its compositions available
at standard per-use rates within negotiated categories of use. If the first were illegal, CBS urged
that ASCAP be forbidden to issue any blanket license or to negotiate any fee except on behalf
of an individual member for the use of his own copyrighted work or works. Broadcast Music,
441 U.S.l, 17; 99 S.Ct. 1551, 1561.
•

198 •

"The giant of the world in the use of music rights", and the "No. l outlet in the history
of entertainment," quoting a CBS witness, Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 1, 4; 99 S.Ct. 1551,
1554.
199

• On the evolving relationship between CBS and ASCAP, see also United States of
America v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, (S.D.N. Y. 1993).

For more details about litigations involving ASCAP, see "Copyright in Free and
Competitive Markets" (W. R. Comish, ed.), ESC Publishing, Oxford, 1986, 92-6.
200

Mr. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion thought that such a request was entirely
proper and that "the blanket all-or-nothing license is patently discriminatory". "The user
•
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"not a species of price fixing categorically forbidden by the Sherman Act," an
unreasonable restraint of trade201 •
purchases full access to ASCAP's entire repertoire, even though his needs could be satisfied by
a far more limited selection.• In the end Justice Stevens observed that "the ASCAP system
requires users to buy more music than they want af a price which, while not beyond their ability
to pay and perhaps not even beyond what is 'reasonable' for the access they are getting, may
well be far higher than they would choose to spend for music in a competitive system."
"The all-or-nothing bargain allows the monopolist to reap the benefits of perfect price
discrimination without confronting the problems posed by dealing with different buyers on
different terms." Cirace, "CBS v. ASCAP: An Economic Analysis of a Political Problem" 47
Ford. L. Rev.277, 286 (1978)
Under the ASCAP consent decree, on receipt of an application, ASCAP is required to
"advise the applicant in writing of the fee which it deems reasonable for the license requested."
If the parties are unable to agree on the fee within 60 days of the application, the applicant may
apply for a judicial determination of a "reasonable fee." United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1951
Trade Cases para. 62, 595, p. 63,754 (SDNY 1950). The BMI decree contains no similar
provision for judicial review.
201

• The Department of Justice first investigated allegations of anti-competitive conduct by
ASCAP in the 30s and 40s. See, Cohen "Music, Radio Broadcasters and the Sherman Act", 29
Geo. L. J. 407, 424 n. 91 (1941). A criminal complaint was filed in 1934, but the Government
was granted a midtrial continuance and never returned to the courtroom. In separate complaints
in 1941, the United States charged the blanket license, which was then the only license offered
by ASCAP and BMI, was an illegal restraint of trade and that arbitrary prices were being
charged as the result of an illegal copyright pool. United States v. ASCAP, Civ. no. 13-95
(SDNY 1941), pp.3-4. The case was settled by a consent decree that imposed tight restrictions
on ASCAP's operations. United States v. ASCAP, 1940-1943 Trade Cases para. 56, 104
(S.D.N. Y. 1941). Following complaints relating to the television industry, successful private
litigation against AS CAP by movie theaters ( Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888
(S.D.N. Y. 1948); M. Witmark & Sons v. Jenson, 80 Supp. 843 (Minn. 1948), appeal
dismissed sub nom.; M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F. 2d 515 (CAB
1949)), and a Government challenge to ASCAP's arrangements with similar foreign
organizations, the 1941 decree was reopened and extensively amended in 1950. United States
v. ASCAP, 1950-1951 Trade Cases para. 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).

The 1950 decree, as amended from time to time, continues in effect, and the blanket
license continues to be the primary instrument through which ASCAP conducts its business
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This opinion shows that competition law and ·copyright law are
complementary, and represents an exquisite demonstration of the idea that
copyright is a commercial regulation. First, Justice White touted the economic
benefits of ASCAP's blanket license, and minimizing the coercion involved,
citing similar coercions present in both compulsory and secondary transmission
cable requirements. 202 Secondly, if it is true that the economic exploitation of
performing rights attains its zenith through a bureaucratic agency203, this can
under the decree. The courts have twice held the decree does not require ASCAP not to issue
licenses for selected portions of its repertory. United States v. ASCAP (Application of
Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc.), 208 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N. Y. 1962), aff'd, 331F.2d117
(CA2), cert. denied,, 377 U.S. 997 (1964); United States v. ASCAP (Application of National
Broadcasting Co.), 1971 Trade Cases para. 73,491 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also, United States
v. ASCAP (Motion of Metromeda, Inc.), 341 F.2d 1003 (CAZ 1965).
202 •

Some examples of this kind of coercion are the compulsory license for secondary
transmission by cable television systems, 17 U.S.C. App. §111 (d)(S)(A), and the license for
the use of copyrighted compositions in jukeboxes, which is usually payable to the performing
rights societies such as ASCAP, id., §118(b).
203

• It is often explained that the interest in collective societies belongs not only to composers
who elsewhere are unable to control all uses of their compositions, but also to users who instead
of having to make a separate contract for each use with each composer, conclude just one
contract with ASCAP for all its 3,000,000 compositions. As is well known, the blanket license'
'price' is composed of the price of individual compositions plus the administrative costs.
Theoretically, ASCAP' s interest, independent of those of its members or of non-member users,
can be calculated.

["Users of music" in the current Articles of the Society are any person, firm, or
corporation who or which: 1. owns or operates an establishment or enterprise where copyrighted
musical compositions are performed publicly for profit, or 2. is otherwise directly engaged in
giving public performance of copyrighted musical compositions for profit. See W. B. Emery,
"Broadcasting and Government: Responsibilities and Regulations" Michigan State UP, 1971,
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certainly only be possible because of the structure of ·copyright law, vesting
commercial privileges which can be optimally used only in a certain way. 204

373.]
Accepting the arguments of efficiency-assuming them to be true-are the courts ready
to embrace, as a solution of all difficult <;ircumstances, bureaucratic mechanisms, which then
primarily, and in the first place, are destined to serve their own interests? [About the role of
bureaucratic agencies in the American society see, Emery, Broadcasting and Government; M.
A, Franklin, & D, A. Anderson, "Mass.Media Law" 4th ed. 1990, 762-3; M. Seidenfeld, "A
Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic state" 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1519-20
(1992)]
204

• The development and growth of organizations involved in monitoring reproduction of
works, using new technologies which rapidly facilite the reproduction of all forms of intellectual
property has made the maturation of collective administration of copyright a reality. It is
motivated by the apparent necessity to counterattack the widespread and decentralized
phenomenon of reproduction, assisting individual owners in enforcing their copyrights.

Nevertheless, if copyright is a monopoly legitimii:ed by the public iiiterest in intellectual
production, and as a logical extension of this assumption collective administration is a necessity,
the issue is how strong this monopoly has to be, and, accordingly the administrative bodies as
well. In copyrighted works, production involves both authors and entrepreneurs, but it is the
latter who have the dominant position among the copyright holders.
In other words, the public interest actually vindicated in this field is the businessmen's

commercial not author's creative interest. With this in mind, the strength of the copyright
monopoly gains little legitimacy from its present level: around 75-100 years, covering almost
any tangible express'ed 'thought'. First, because among businessmen, those involved in
intellectual production are obviously uniquely protected by monopoly power, secondly because
among those involved in copyright, a member of an administrative collective society gains
administratively a dominant commercial position, and thirdly, an individual author has no real
ability to penetrate the copyright business without a private or collective "agent", Conseq1,1ently,
the present status of the copyright monopoly as actually administrated seems no more amenable
to more rational solutions than to square the circle.
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C.

COLLECTNE PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN

MUSIC

In Europe205 , the collective copyright administration-including music-,

is basically the same as the American practice206 • If collecting societies were

205

• Europe, for pUipOses of this paper, means EEC, or that Europe, presented suggestively
by P. Y. Gautier, as "a matron who is in good health, has twelve children, so far, and endeavors
to secure the prosperity of all her family." "The 'Single Market' for Works of Art" 144
R.I.D.A. 12, 12 (1990)

On the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty establishing the European Community (EEC), see e.g, N.
Green, "The Legal Foundations of the Single European Market" Oxford; New York: Oxford
UP, 1991.
206

Apparently everything is quite similar: The majority of authors' societies are societies
concerned with private rights although the Italian society, SocietA Italiana degli Autori ed Editori
(SIAE) is a society concerned with public rights. Not only is SIAE subject to continuous
supervision by the Presiding Commitee of the Italian Society of Ministers, but its articles of
association must be confirmed by a Presidential decree.
•

Even if the majority of societies are involved with private rights, they are watched over,
in one way or another by public authorities, ranging from governmental appointment of a
number of the administrators (in the Nordic countries) or of an official (the Netherlands
performing rights organization, Het Bureau voor Muziek-Auteursrecht--BUMA--is subject to
permanent supervision by the Minister of Justice), to the obligation to account for its
administration to a protective body (in the Republic of Germany), or directly to the Secretary
of State (in France). Except for Luxembourg, which has no collecting societies of its own, in
each EEC member state the licensing of music performance rights abroad is orchestrated by a
single organization. See A. Dietz, "Copyright Law in the European Community" 212-37 (1978).
On the United Kingdom, where apparently there are two powerful.collective societies,
see, Whale on Copyright 134-5; Fujitani, Controlling the Market, 129-31.
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originally established to handle the right to perform alive music to
audiences207 , when recordings came about, they quickly expanded their
function with the aim of administering the right to mechanical reproduction and
distribution of musical

recordings.

From authors'

rights,

collective

administration spread to other rights, such as performers' rights, the rights of
audio and audiovisual producers', and broadcasters rights, as well as expanding
their focus from the national to the international level208 •
Unlike the American system, most European countries make a distinction
between the author's right to royalties and the protection of producer's rights.
As the materialization of authorship, the author's copyright is vested only in the

individual author. The sound recording producer is endowed with so-called

. The first performing rights society, Societe des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique
(SACEM) was formed in 1851, in France. See H. C. Jehoram, "Basic Principles of Copyright
Organizations" 26 Copyright 214, 215 (1990).
On the French domestic basic regulation of collective societies, see Bertrand, Le droit
d'auteur, 740-2.
208

• There is a specialized private international organization for musical performing rights,
which establishes an international system of reciprocity between collecting societies all over the
world, the Confederation Internationale des Societes des Auteurs et Compositeurs-CISAC. For
details, Karnell, op. cit. 18-21. ASCAP itself has, as well, agreements with 41 foreign
organizations. B. Korman, I. F. Koenigsberg, "Performing Rights in Music and Performing
Rights Societies" 33 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 332, 353-54 (1986).

an eco-esc pendulum of copyright

86
neighboring rights209 • (This difference, however is often neglected, and it is
not uncommon that authors and producers become members of the same society.
However, in this paper.I will discuss only the relationship between composers,
performing rights societies and EEC law2 10 .)
209 •

This term of art is an abbreviation of "rights neighboring to copyright." It was first used
in 1948 at the Brussels Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention. In this
way, for first time, a wish to protect three other interests was expressed-those of performers,
phonogram producers, and broadcasters--independently from the author's rights~ Finally it led
to the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations, the Rome Convention of October 10/28, 1961. See, Porter, Beyond
the Berne Convention, 20-1; H. Cohen Jehoram, "The Relationship between Copyright and
Neighboring Rights" 144 R.l.D.A. 81, (1990) [hereinafter Cohen, Copyright and Neighboring
Rights].
In Europe, the European Commulli.ties have embarked on a whole range of proposals
aimed at improving neighboring rights protection, primarily for performers and phonogram
producers. These measures might be considered as a first step, not to protect carriers of
information at the same level as the authors, but "to replace authors by industry." Cohen,
Copyright and Neighboring Rights, at 123.
These propositions started with the Green Paper on Copyright of the Commission of the
European Communities [Com (88) 172 final, Brussels, 7 June 1988), and include in particular
a recommendation from a Council decision concerning accession <lf all Member States to the
Rome Convention by December 1992. See, W. Rumphorst, "Neighboring Rights Protection of
Broadcasting Organizations" 10 EIPR 339 [1992).
210 •

For the purpose of this paper, EEC law includes Articles 30 to 36 of the EEC Treaty
which deal with the free movement of goods-and especialy Article 36 which allows, as the
permissible grounds for restrictions· on imports, "the protection of industrial and commercial
property"--, Article 59 in respect of the free movement of services, and Articles 85-6 which
prohibit certain agreements which prevent, restrict or distort competition within the Common
Market and may affect trade between Member States. See, H. E. Pearson, and C. G. Miller,
"Commercial Exploitation of Intellectual Property" Blackstone Press ltd., 1990, 235-47
[hereinafter Pearson, Commercial Exploitation]; E. McKnight, "Copyright and a Single Market
in Broadcasting" 10 EIPR 343, 344 [1992].
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As is often noticed, the author who becomes a· member of a copyright
society relinquishes to a great extent his "proprietary right." Since the society
has as its declared objective to maximize its repertoire revenue, it cannot be
choosy in licensing. "The composer who wants to have his symphony performed
by the Wiener but not by the Berliner Philharmoniker" -du Bois, the legal head
of the Dutch BUMA once remarked-"should not become a member .of a
copyright society". And yet, as an outsider, a composer has no meaningful
chance to exploit his work.
The European collecting societies claim legitimacy for their activity on two
grounds:

(1) Authors'

rights,

perhaps owing their genesis to more

philosophically aesthetic arguments, as well as neighboring rights, have actually

A prestigious European collective legal work "left aside the case law concerning the
application of Article 86 to authors' right societies", for the reason that "does not concern the
specific character of copyright.• See Copyright in Free and Competitive Markets. I politely
disagree.
However, I use in this section "reproduction" according to the French definition,
consisting of physical copying of the work by any process which enables it to be communicated
directly or indirectly to the public. It is characterized by the creation of physical sound media,
such as the manufacture of a record. "Performance,• in the same terminology, consists in "the
direct communication of the work to the public.• It may be done by performers before the public
or by means of physical recordings of the work. See id., at 21.
Also, not be discussed here, is the case law of the Court of Justice in consideration with
the European Free Trade Association (EFfA) and the copyright market.
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become effective economic rights to remuneration. (2) As economic rights, there
is only one way. to handle them efficiently, which is collectively. This analysis
also explains the single-minded determination of these societies to seek profits
so aggressively because the membership whose sole interest is defined as
pecuniary depends on income received from the society.
However, after collection the revenues have to be distributed, apparently
not a simple matter. After deduction of costs--including the societies'
considerable expanses-and assigning a portion of revenue for social and cultural
purposes-, the rest belongs to authors on the basic principle that the money
should be paid to the authors whose works have been played or performed
during the time for which the money is collected. Here occurs the problem,
common to all collective societies, the problem of gathering program
information. It appears this intractable problem cannot be solved, only
compromised. Consequently, each society applies its own system of distribution,
using its criteria and inevitable imperfections.
From the beginning of his career the composer knows that he has virtually
no chance to exploit his composition on his own. Accordingly, he accepts the
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proce&s of fees distribution211 , as well as the possibility. of an eventual open
conflict with his society. To the contrary, collective societies share no such
reluctarice or ambivalence and enjoy and cultivate their composer-members
support, because- they are their apparent source of income.
Thus, the relations between the European (and U.S.) collective societies
and their members are structured on the dominant position of the first, who in
tum logically feel free to promote their own interests even at the risk of damage
to its members. For example, before the 1970s, the German collective society
insisted on an all-or-nothing assignment: A member had to choose between
assigning all his present and future rights to GEMA or, lose his membership
status.
The Commission of the European Community212 has intervened directly
in the structure and management of these societies in countries within the EEC.
A detailed account of the functioning of thesw collecting societies, the
211
•

On blanket license system and fees distribution, see also P. Goldstein, "Commentary on

'An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives'" 78 Va. L. Rev. 413, (1992).
212

• The Commission of the European Communities, based in Brussels, has the primary
responsibility for the enforcement of EEC competition law, Articles 85-6 of the Treaty. The
Commission is the equivalent of the EEC civil service, which derives most of its power from
orders of. the Council of Ministers, representing the governments of the Member States.
Decisions of the Commission can be reviewed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), based
in Luxembourg. Pej\rson, Commercial Exploitation 242-3.
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Commission and the European Court provided in two major decisions, in Re
GEMA213 , which involved the German society2 14 , and in Belgische Radio
en Televisie v SABAM.215(no.2) 216 • Those decisions made clear that
whatever practices a collective

s~iety

uses, they may not be abusive. It was

emphasized that an abuse may arise either "from the terms of the constitution of
a collecting society, or from its internal decisions, or from its transactions with
members or outsiders; and that a practice may be abusive in its unfairness either
to members or potential members or to users of the works. "217 Thus, even if

213

(no.1)[1971]C.M.L.R. D35 OJL 134/15, and (no.2)[1972]C.M.L.R. DUS.

•

214

Gesellshaft fiir musikalische Auffiihrungs- und mechanische
Vervielfiiltigungsrechte/Gennossenschaft zer Verwertung Musikalischer Auffiihrungsrechte.
215

• SABAM is the Belgian Association of Authors, Composers and Publishers. It is a
cooperative association whose object is to exploit, administer, and manage all copyrights and
kindred rights, for its members and associates and for its clients and affiliated undertakings.
Almost all authors resident in Belgium seek the help of SABAM in collecting their royalties.

In BRT v. SABAM (1974 E. Comm. CT. J. REP. 51, 2 COMM. MKT. L.R. 238) the
Commission pointed that copyright collective societies are undertakings within the meaning of
Articl~ 86: By acting as agencies which safeguard the rights of musical composers, they perform
the function of an undertaking engaged in the provision of services. Furthermore, because these
societies have a quasi-monopoly in the field of authors' rights in their respective countries, they
are deemed to have a dominant position in a substantial part of the Common Market. For more
details, see F. L. Fine, "The Impact of EEC Competition Law on the Music Industry" 12 J. Intl.
L. Bus. 508, 519-20 (1992) [hereinafter Fine, The Impact of EEC].
216

217

•

Case 127/73, [1974] E.C.R. 313.

•

Stone, Copyright Law, at 126
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noticed only in passing, that a collective society will act in its own interest,
ignoring its charge to protect its members' interests, is significant enough to
merit discussion in EEC case law.
Re GEMA (No. 1) represents the most detailed examination of the internal

regulations of a collecting society primarily from the viewpoint of EEC
competition rules. The Commission issued that GEMA had abused its dominant
position (a) by discriminating against nationals of other Member States218 and
(b) by binding its members to excessive obligations. The Commission said that

"the abuse also lies in the fact that GEMA binds its members by obligations
which are not objectively justified." These were: (i) the restriction on members
freedom to divide rights, its members being required to assign their rights for
all categories and regions; (ii) The unfairly complicated rules governing the
transfer of membership to other societies, including assignment of future works
and long waiting periods; (iii) the absence of judicial recourse of members over
internal procedures and rights; and (iv) the denial of ordinary status for members

218

That society refused to conclude contracts with others if they are established in Member
States other than Germany.
•
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who are economically dependent on, or employed by, a user of musical
works219.
It was also held in Re GEMA (No. 1) that, "insofar as membership
depends on income received from the society, credit must be given for similar
income from similar societies established in other Member States; that a society
must not confer economic benefits on some members at the expense of others
without reasonable justification," and "that it is an abuse for a collecting society
to attempt to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts to review the society's
decisions at the request of its members. "220
In addition to this problem of discrimination regarding membership or

members' rights, the Commission also condemned excessive requirements
related to assignments. Thus, both GEMA decisions established that a collecting
society must not insist on receiving an assignment from its members of rights
for countries in which the society does not carry out direct administration of its
rights, but authorizes a foreign societ)' to act as its agent.
The issue of abusive internal relationships between the collective society
219

• However, in 1981, the Commission permitted GEMA to amend its rules to protect its
members against pressures from financially powerful music users.

220

•

Stone, Copyright Law, at 127.
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and its members, addressed in the 1970's was extended in the 1980s to the
international arena concerning abusive representations of each collective society
of a Member State by the analogous collective society in another State. In 1989,
The European Court, in a case involving the French collective society for
musical works-SACEM-, ruled in a very delicate issue concerning reciprocal
representation agreements between collective societies in connection with Article
85 of the EEC Treaty221•
The Court ruled also in regard to the abuse of a dominant position,
contrary to Article 86, through the demand for excessive royalties (the
continental performing societies practice, as do their American counterparts, the

221

Minist&e Public v. Tournier, Case 395/87, decided 13 July 1989, Stone, Copyright
Law at 212. Normally, SACEM is involved in cases of unfair trading conditions under both
Articles 85 and 86-which means dominant positions in their relationship with music •users,•
which is not this paper's topic. (Usually, discotheque operators claim that SACEM's tariffs are
higher than those applied by the authors' societies in the other member states, and oppose its
lump sum clause found in SACEM standard contracts concluded with these operators. The lump
sum clause requires, as does the ASCAP blanket license, one payment for its entire repertoire.
The irony of this situation is that only seldom do European discotheques play other than
American music.)
•

About the two similar rulings of 13th July in the Court of Justice, concerning SACEM
and the discotheque operators, see Fran!;()n, A. "The Conflict between SACEM and
Discotheques before the Court of Justice of the European Communities• 144 R.I.D.A. 50
(1990).
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blanket license system222). The significance of these reciprocal representations
between admittedly dominant national collective societies for the purpose of this
discussion is that it becomes impossible for an outsider composer to penetrate
the business. There is no choice in order to exploit his composition, otherwise
than by accepting a membership within a collective society. The corollary of this
is that the collective societies exercise complex control over the copyright music
market. 223
222

• With respect to this practice and its effects, a very suggestive case was decided by the
Italian Constitutional Court, (decision no. 241 of the 3rd of May, 1990). It found constitutional
article 180 of the Italian Copyright Act, under articles 3, 23 and 41 of the Italian Constitution,
reversing a lower court decision. (Under art. 180-3, of the Italian Copyright Law/ L. 22 April
1941--Protezione del diritto d'autore e di altri diritti connessi al suo esercizio--the Italian
collective society, la Societa italiana degli autori ed editori (S.I._t\.E.), is the sole Italian licensor
of copyright. In these circumstances it is not difficult to imagine that there are no negociations,
just that imposed by this organization.

Article 3 della Constituzione Italiana provides equal treatment among partners to
negotiations, and article 41 regulates any public activity--which might be considered S.I.A.E' s
activity and social goal. With respect to article 23, about fiscal attribution, the users claimed that
the S.I.A.E. actually fixed taxes for the use of any copyrighted work of its repertoire. See the
Italian Constitution and Copyright Act in E. B. Benucci, and M. Fabiani "Codice della proprieta
industriale e del diritto d'autore" AG--Milano, 1982)
·
This decision is important not because it doesn't consider that the lack of equal treatment
by S.I.A.E., is sufficient proof of on unconstitutionality. It is suggestive because the
Constitutional Court doesn't seem interested in the danger of monopolizing potentionally
important information by a bureaucratic organism, by ignoring important social needs. 146
R.I.D.A. 257 (1990).
223

Towards the end of 1960 and in the 1980s the Commission examined the rules
of the societies and the agreements for reciprocal representation in the light of Articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty of Rome. Articles 85 and 86 are known as the. EEC competition rules. Article
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In the early 80s the Court of Justice also had the opportunity to interpret

Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty224 with respect to the activity of music
collective societies. GEMA unsuccessfully sued225 , under German Copyright
Law, the importers of recorded music legally manufactured in another Member
State--with the consent of the owner of the cQPyright in the works concerned'"-,
for a charge of l. 75 per cent of the retail price. GEMA demanded from the

85(1) prohibits agreements and concerted practices which have the ooject or effect of restricting
competition within the Common Market, subject to the possibility of an exemption (individual
or in block) on public policy grounds pursuant to Article 85(3). In qrper to qualify for an
exemption under Article 85(3), an agreement must satisfy two "positive" and two "negative"
criteria. The "positive" criteria are that the agreement must either contribute to improving the
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress. The
"negative" criteria are that the agreement must not impose restrictions which are not
"indispensable" nor which may eliminate competition with respect to' a "substantial part" of the
products or services in question.

Article 86 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position in the Common Market or a
substantial part of it. In contrast to Article 85, however, Article 86 does not provide any
possible exemption from a finding of abuse.
These Treaty provisions are supplemented by the Manager" Control Regulation--MCR--,
adopted by the Council of Ministers in December 19889 and which went into effect on
September 21, 1990. (33 O.. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L257) 14 (1990). See also Fine, The Impact
of EEC, 508.
224

•.The French Government had contended that Article 30 et seq. of the EEC Treaty was
not applicable owing to the specifics of copyright arising from moral rights. Cornish (ed),
Copyright in a Free Market, at 29.
225

•

Musik-Vertrleb Membran v. GEMA, Judgment of the Court of justice of 20 January

1981, in Joined Cases 55 and 57/80, [1981] ECR 147.
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importers the difference between the royalties paid in the United Kingdom--the
country of first marketing--and the royalties which it would have received if the
records had been first marketed in Germany (8 per cent of the retail price).
This is another clear example of the reification of the relationship between
the membership and the collective society, when the copyright owner's interest
becomes undeniable distinct, even opposed, to that of the collective
administration's interest226 : Even if the individual owner assigned or licensed
his performing right to a manufacturer, from another Member State, which has
no contractual relations with GEMA, after considering that this is in her best
interest, GEMA attempted to prevent this. There is no individual composer,
even hypothetically, whose interest is being served, there is just very clearly the
separate and divergent interest of GEMA in its repertoire and its decision to
226

• Another attempt of the same type also belongs to GEMA when in 1984 it announced its
intention to charge German copyright royalties on all custom pressings performed in West
Germany, even where the record company had obtained a mechanical license from the
mechanical copyright society of another Member State. The Commission found GEMA's
practice would have infringed Article 85. In the Commission's view, a license granted by the
copyright collecting society of a Member State is valid throughout the Community and authorizes
the manufacture of sound recordings, even by means of custom pressings, in any Member State.
See Fine, The Impact of EEC, 514.

As is quite obvious, the Commission sees its interest as regulating the business
relationship, to give as equal a chance of bargaining as possible equal chances of bargain to
sound recording manufacturers, conclusively assuming that composers, for example, are already
protected by their mere status as members in collective societies.
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maximize its institutional interest. 227
This has been often noticed if not routinely deplored by European
scholars. Concerning the( French practice, for example, if copyright is regarded
as a proprietary rather than aesthetic right, scholars have characterized the result
as a nationalization of the composers' rights by the use of equitable shared
royalties among owners228 • Thus, the price for membership is the alienation
of the author's rights as the price of a remuneration, which is' based more on
purely economic criteria, than on other factors even though continental
authorship rights are based on theories that reject an economic fundament. 229

m. It would be good to remember that Europe is the continent which provides author's
moral rights. Then, what of the author's unassignable moral right to decide which environment
is the best for the cultural and economical exploitation of his own work?
228

In original: • expropriation en matiere musicale: la remuneration equitable". p. y.
Gautier, "Propriete litteraire et artistique," Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1991, 135-8.
The author seems more concerned about the situation of neighboring rights than that of author's
rights owner.
•

229

• This may be a good opportunity to emphasize that in both systems, Copyright and
Authorship, the rights are vested in the author or owner of the intellectual work-other than
industrial--by the fact of a legal relationship with that work. That neither authorship nor any
intellectual relationship caused by the mere fact of creation generates the copyright/author's
right. Contrary, the intellectual work, defined by each domestic statute, as any piece of real
property, generates to any of its "possessors" special monopoly rights. By "possessor" I mean
the person or corporation with the right of control over the work, drawing the means of its
future exploitation.

The only perceptible difference between the Copyright domestic statutes and the
Authorship statutes is their underlying philosophy: In Copyright system the intellectual work--
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It may dampen competition among composers members, but in any case it
proves that the so-called economic incentives implied by copyright/author's
rights theories have no more role here than it had at the beginning of its history.
Working for the collective societies, effectively as mere employees, composers
will create more or less following their own capacities and predilections, and not
by the effective salary they receive "working for a collective society. "230 The
incentive theory is not dead, it was never more than a myth.

*
In the U.S. or in Europe, the music business is structured in the same

way: The composers are the workers, normally, and their "agent" is the true

other than that with industrial functionality-- has value due to its potential commercial
exploitation; while in the Authorship system, the same kind of work has legal importance due
to its capacity of imposing a national culture and identity.
These maybe subtle observations are more and more touchable in the present international
environment dominated by new strategies of world colonization.
230

• While ASCAP worldwide (non:.ciomestic) receipts were $358 million in 1990, the British
Performing Right Society collected approximately $220 million, and the French SACEM total
revenues for the same year were about $431 million. Besen, at 385.
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beneficiary. Assuming that this is the only way to run the music business, and
the only way to assure composers a share in the benefit of their music, what is
the justification for the long copyright monopoly?
What about the theory of reward for authorial efforts? What about
economic and "moral" incentives? How does one justify a commercial monopoly
in an age of free trade and free markets?
In this context, what about the ultimate basis of copyright statutes (in U .K.

and in the U .S.A), to support and promote learning and mass education? Has
that been just language, or, if it had a real meaning is it now outdated? Or if
true as national domestic policy might it not reflect international realities? Some
of these issues are addressed in the third part of this paper.
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BOOK ID. RESURRECTION

Because the ideology of copyright is so deep-seated the reader may be
tempted to fabricate new theories to save it from the argument so far presented
that copyright is just a private commercial regulation. But a close examination
of the earliest and still most important international treaty should serve us as
antidote to this temptation.

A. THE BERNE CONVENTION

The Berne Convention represents not only the climax of 19th century
universalism, but the framework within which (what were then the
representatives of) the dominant players in the international community have
been promoting and securing their intellectual property interests. The first Berne

Conference took place in 1883, and "set the business like tone for the whole
operation. "231 This tone is colored by a Romantic (Victor) Hugo-ian vision of

231

•

Saunders, Authorship, at 175.
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cultural politics232 • Even if this vision is different from the purely industrial
and commercial vision underlying the U.S. refusal- of joining the Treaty233 ,
both visions ultimately influenced Berne protections. 234

232

In the last half of the 19th century, national creations became particularly valued as "an
exportable product and a source of culttlrill legitimacy." See Saunders, Authorship, at 171.
•

With France seeking its place as the Humanity of the world, as Victor Hugo it expressed
in the Guide to the 1867 Universelle Exposition (P. Greenhalgh, "Ephemeral Vistas. A History
of the Expositions Universelles, Great Exhibitions and World Fairs" Manchester UP,
Manchester, 1988, at 16) the twelve countries present at the 1886 Conference- Switzerland,
Germany, France, the UK, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Tunisia, Liberia, Haiti, and the USA and
Japan as observers--, realized that the Berne Convention had important justification preserving
their identities within an evolving cultural trade, and if possible encouraging its export.
233

• The United States refusal is consistent with its prior approach to Copyright. The
copyright industry was too important to allow a "single" person to control a work's exploitation
for all countries. (S. Ricketson,
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works: 1886-1986" Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College and
Kluwer, London, 1987 at 56.)

"The

Even if that individual was not in fact the author, but his publisher, or his agent, that is
a commercial party, Copyright did not implicate a free market where competitors would have
had unlimited powers. The decision to publish a work was supported not only by economic, but
by political reasons, whether or not cultural, educational or informational logic reinforced it.
On the other hand, the American domestic market was still sufficient to satisfy the industry. The
United States would change it attitude toward the Berne Convention not when the external
market become dominant, but when the domestic market no longer relied upon cultural imports.
In other words, when piracy ceased to be a national policy, because the domestic market had
sufficiently developed--in fact became internationally dominant!
Thus, the international extension of American copyright becomes justifiable because
practically it works no harmful impact domestically upon a rich American society where the
"tax" for the work's use is affordable and is an ideal way of maximizing the external market.
234

It is very important to note that originally, the Berne Convention did not mention
"moral rights", which always were considered the bridge between the Common-law copyright
and the Civil law author's right. The international protection of copyrighted works actually
•
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Almost from the beginning, the idea of a

r~al

universal framework of

uniform regulation was rejected, and instead, the national treatment principle
was adopted. Under that, each member country, appreciating best its own
interests, will adopt the domestic statute which sued it best, and will impose it
not only upon to its own citizens but upon any foreign author seeking protection.
This policy of national treatment is adjusted by a minimum level of protection
ensured by the treaty's terms. The work of the Berne Convention continues
within the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the umbrella
organization which oversees the operation of this treaty and the other main
multilateral conventions. It persists in giving a general impression of an
institutional effort to respond universally to everybody's particular needs. 235
lacked any Romantic basis behavior. What was Romantic was the national desire to accede
through culture to a dominant world position.
However, the 'moral right' was embraced by the Convention at the 1928 Rome
Revision. Before the 1928 Conference, there was no mention of this right. "Only when the
Conference began did the Italian delegation propose that the right of attribution, the right of
integrity and the right of disclosure be adopted as part of the Convention." (Saunders,
Authorship, at 182. E. See Piola-Caselli, "Codice del diritto di autore. Commentario della nuova
legge 22 aprile 1941--XIX, n. 633" UTET, Turin, 1943.)
In this context, I confess I suspect the international community of a philanthropic, good
deed after all. Who proposed this "right"? The representatives of a country in which the author
has no economic power, all license contracts being made by S.I.A.E..
235

• For an overview of the connections between the main international copyright
organizations, see Porter, Beyond the Berne Convention, 69-100.
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B. THE COPYRIGHT BATTLE .OF THE TWO ROSES:
THE USA AND THE EEC

In many ways the concern of copyright policy is to confer monopoly
protection on intellectual goods which cannot be patented236 , such as
technologies in computer programs, semiconductors, and electronic transmission
of signals and data. Regarding computer programs, "most industrial countries
have moved to provide standard copyright protection since programs are

236

• On the international protection of intellectual property, it is generally accepted, that the
Berne, Rome and other conventions, negotiated through a series of international conferences,
allow individual states the freedom to consider the advantages and disadvantages of joining a
particular convention, and of deciding how best to take advantage of each of them. On the other
hand there are supranational treaties, such as NAFrA and EEC. They establish not just
alternative procedural arrangements, to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)which administers the Bene Convention-, but substantial means to protect and promote their
members interests.

What is revealing is that today, copyright protection inside the EEC uses the same
method to escape harmonization, as it did in 1789 to escape abolition: Even if today it claims
that its philosophy is the "natural author's right" in his work, which legitimiz.es as long a term
as possible, Article 222 of the Treaty of Rome exempted it from the common market in goods
and services, on the same old reason that it is included in the system of property ownership of
the Member States. Porter, Beyond the Bene Convention, at 26.

A comparison of WIPO's and EEC's efficiency would yield one of the reasons for the
Stockholm conference: The Berne Convention was accepted to protect literary and artistic works
against new technological developments, but did not reconcile the demands and needs of the
First and the Third World. See, Porter, Beyond the Berne Convention, 9-10.
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expressed in a literary medium and do not have direct industrial utility. "237
With respect to semiconductors, industrial countries, including the European
Community, have recognized the need for a unique protective mechanism for
chip topographies. In this case, because they are not "easy" copyrightable, the
companies involved in such a technology· resigned themselves to a 10 year
monopoly (subject to limited exceptions).
Within the area of electronic signal transmission, the problem of payment
involves not only the copyright owner's earnings, but also another, more subtle
and interesting issue of economic, political and cultural interests. Nevertheless,
this second echelon problem of payment is doubly important. First, it shows that
237

• "The European Community as a World Partner", 52 European Economy, 1, 175 (1993)
[hereinafter The European Community].

Within the EEC there is now legislation specifically providing for copyright protection
of computer programs in France (by an Act of 3 july 1985), in Germany (by an Act of 24 June
1985), in Spain (by an Act of 11 November 1987), as well as in the united Kingdom (under the
1988 Act, which replaces a similar provision contained in the Copyright (Computer Software)
Amendment Act of 1985. Moreover the EC Commission, in its recent Green paper on
Copyright and the Challenge of Technology- Copyright Issues requiring Immediate Attention (
Ch. 5, ·pp. 170-204 of the Green Paper deals specifically with computer programs), envisaged
the adoption of a directive under Article lOOA of the EEC Treaty, designed to harmonize the
laws of the Member States in relation to the protection of computer programs within copyright.
In January 1989 the Commission filed with the Council a proposal for such a directive. See
[1989] O.J.E.C. C9/13, [1989) 2 C.M.L.R., Stone, Copyright Law, 14, 178.
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Even so, there are claims that copyright provides insufficient protection for software; that
copyright may be easily circumvented by imitators who need only to rewrite the code sufficiently
to convince the courts that the imitating program did not result from "slavish copying."
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actually there is no individual copyright author, and thus no or far less reason
for copyright to be considered an economic incentive for any author. The
payment is made to corporate entities: (i) the program's producer which owns
the copyright and (ii) its broadcaster which owns the neighboring right. Second,
both payment solutions advanced by the EEC and the USA necessarily imply a
bureaucratic system: The European Community attempts to establish a
harmonized policy in its member countries that would transfer greater payments
to broadcasters, through collective societies. The US compromise provides that
broadcasters get limited copyright protection plus remuneration from cable
operators at a price set by government!

An interesting though collateral issue involving the transmission of
electronic signals is related to the incestuous economic interests of both
producers of broadcasting equipment and of broadcasting systems. States'
political and cultural considerations merge and complicate the picture238 •
When the Japanese proposed a unique image-production of 1125 lines and
238

The cultural concern for broadcasting "real European programs" /"programmes europeens
proprement dits" evolved on a large scale with the use of the two TV satellites--Astra lA and
Astra lB. P. Werner, "Une fa~n de faire de la television Europeenne" 355 Revue du Marche
Cummun et de l'Union Europeenne 168, 169 (1992).
•
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60 Hz it acquired considerable influence because of the already wide spread
MUSE system of distribution239 • The European Community immediately had

its broadcasting equipment and broadcasting system industries create the rival
EUREKA system. The European EUREKA system of signal-distribution, and
the TVHDffiFTV (Television

a

Haute Definition/HiFi Television) 240 are

central issues within the European Community cultural environment. Even more

239

This is the French abbreviated denomination of the Japanese system. Y. Guinet, "Sur
la genese du program Europren de TVHD EUREKA 95," 127, 127, id.
240

•

"L'arrivre de la TVHD constitue un enjeu mondial ~ complex qui touche autant
l'industrie eJ.ectronique que l'industrie des programmes et !es teJ.espectateurs, et trois
protagonistes rivalisent dans la bataille intemationales des normes: le Japon, !'Europe et !es Etats
Unis. "IHFTV constitutes a very complex world~de issue which affects not only the electronic
industry, producers and consumers, but also involves a rivalry between the interests for world
supremacy: between Japan, Europe and the United States. (Europe in this context means Western
Europe, and its TV systems are PAL and SECAM, and the American system is NTSC. In this
context that which first developed the most advanced broadcasting system is Japan, with MUSE).
J. M. Cruzate, "L'Europe et la Communaute: fondu-enchaine vers la television haute definition
" id. 101, 101 [hereinafter, Cruzate, L'Europe].
•

Broadcasting represents for the European Community an opportunity to unify Europe.
But their problem is not only how to establish a common political goal of creating an internal
market, in the "agricultural style" -broadcast formats, for example, "would be prescribed, as
there are standards for chickens' eggs"- but the Member States wish to preserve their hope that
European harmoni7ation, on one hand "will go along with a recognition of national standards
and features," and on the other hand, they will be able to "defend" themselves "against
American predominance." The defensive strategy includes show business also. For details about
this interference between the economic, cultural and political aspects of broadcasting, see
"European Co-production in Film and Television. !Id Munich Symposium on Film and Media
Law" J.Becker/M. Rehbinder, (eds), 1-5, 1989.
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since the Maastricht Treaty241 , they are determined to ensure a Western
European

hegemony242

marshalling

blatent

commercial

regulation,

protec?onism, and copyright doctrine to achieve that goal. As discussed here,
the line between those techniques is illusory.

C. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FACES
HYDRA

An objective understanding of international copyright243 is useful.
Without it, there is the danger of being manipulated by efforts to legitimize on
the basis fabricant public benefits through private rights acting as incentives for

241

See, X. Fels, "Presentation", id. 99, 99.
Even before Maastricht, HiFiTV constituted one of the EEC's priorities, especially in
December 1988, and in 1989 when its legal ·content was articulated in The Directive
89/337/CEE. Cruzate, L'Europe, 105.
•

242. It is beyoµd doubt that the EEC is dominated by its competition with its overseas partner.
A recent article compared NAFl'A and EEC law, emphasizing their common politics concerning
industrial property, including copyright. The author also noticed that it was in the context of the
Uruguay Round, that NAFl'A first established important rights in intellectual property./"C'est
a partir des travaux realises dans le
de la Ronde Uruguay que 1' ALENA a etabli pour la
premiere fois d'importants droits et obligations en matiere de propriete intellectualle." J.-Y.
Grenon, "L' Accord de libre echange nord-americain compare a la Communaute economique
europeenne" 367 Revue du Marche Commun et de l'Union Europeenne 306, 313.

eadre

243

•

See supra note no. 1.
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creativity one of the most powerful commercial monopolies in the world. And
because the copyright mystique is commonly presented in very different terms
to developed nations than to less developed ones the following respond to the
arguments addressed to the former.

Unlike users in the developing countries--the developed ones have a long
tradition acknowledging that literary and artistic works provide social, cultural
and economic benefits that each society wishes to secure for their population.
These works involve significant economic costs, including training, time,
materials, and technology acquisition. To cover these costs and to reward
creativity, allowing ultimately the dissemination of ideas, only the copyright
system, 244 it is argued, is suitable.245
However, a large part of the costs246 are due to the corporations

244

•

See supra note no. 1.

245

• On the property rights system, the reward system and the use of contracts in establishing
the property rights value in information, see Shaven, "Economic Analysis of Law," item #11,
Chapter 8. Property Rights in Information, Class Notes, Harvard Law School, Fall 1993. The
author pleas for property rights in information which value of use might be fairly established by
contracts.
246

For one of the major analyses of the effect of copyright inefficiencies in the cost of the
product, see Breyer, The Uneasy Case.
•
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expenses, as long as they own the copyright247 • As long as the author is an
employee248 , their argument that reducing the returns of creativity will result
from uncompensated infringement, is a false or at least, deceptive one. On one
hand the retail price of copying machines in Europe includes a percentage
dedicated for copyright and other related rights owners249 • And on the other
hand, in developing countries, relatively free access to copyrighted works has
to be endorsed for the sake of human rights, such as the right to access to
information250 •
247

• See J. F. Hornick, "Computer Program Copyrights: Look and Feel No Evil," Software
L. J. vol. 5 355, (1992).
248

• This is the status of the author today in developed countries, who is either an employee
of companies producing software, and other technological products, or an employee in the
entertainment industry, such as broadcasting. For a comparative presentation of the employer-employee (author) relationship, in the United Kingdom and the United States, see N. J. Wilkof,
"Continuity and Discontinuity in the Law of the Author as First Owner" 8 EIPR 288 (1991).
For a general presentation of the author-employee under U.S law, see R. C. Dreyfuss, "The
Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976" 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 590 (1987).

About the distinction between the "natural author" and "the author-in-law", called also
"the corporate author", see Patterson, Copyright Overextended, 390.
249

See, for example, the pricing of VCR and video tape in France. Those percentages are
collected by specialized collective societies.
250

•

"Le droit d'acces aux informations, qui est plutOt garanti qu'assure, est place dans le
contexte d 'un droit de J'homme, ce qui contraint ane le limiter que dans des cas exceptionnels,
mais non au territoire et aux citoyens de la Communaute. "I The right of access to information,
which is merely recognized than secured, is defined ·as a human right. In this context, it can be
limited only exceptionally, and never with regard to EEC citiz.ens. L. Kriimer, "La Directive
90/313/CEE sur l'acces a !'information en matiere d'environment: genese et perpectives
•
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At the legislative level, there is an urgency in the pleas for greater
enforcement of copyright which should be understood in the context of a new
era of truly international trade. Most of the interested companies-- intensive
copyright owners-, are multinational, meaning net paid profit at many levels
and regions. They earn both in the parent corporation country, in national
currency, and, by establishing subsidiaries which produce copyrighted goods,
foreign income, usually by license fees, with a keen interest in maximizing the
foreign income251 •
d'application" 353 Revue du Marche Commun et de !'Union Europeenne 866, 866 (1991).
When the right to be informed is accepted, even if in a very narrowed way, as a human
right, in the benefit of the citizens of developed nations, at least in the same way, due to its
importance for human life, mutatis mutandis it should be so in the benefit of the developing
countries. There, information might not be considered subject to anti-piracy legal measures, and
a copyright owner infringement suit might be pre-emptied by the user's right to access to
information.
The subtle implications for human welfare in developing countries of restricting
unauthorized copying have been broadly acknowledged. See, Johnson (1985), Novos and
Waldman (1984) and Liebowitz (1985), all of them cited in The European Community, 175.
251

• For example one international debate provoked by the large software companies in order
to improve their competitive position invokes reverse engineering. While all companies, such
as IBM, Ashton-Tate and Microsoft, based their production on it, they are those "who wish to
outlaw reverse engineering" by other's practices. A. Johnson-Laird, "Reverse Engineering of
Software: Separating Legal Mythology from Actual Technology" Software L. J. vol. 5. 331, 354
(1992).

See also the EEC position concerning software copyrightability, in A. Fakes, "The
EEC's Directive on Software Protection and its Moral Rights Loophole," Software L. J. vol.
5 531 (1992).
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It is true, however, that the magnitude of royalties and fees paid depend

on government policies, which are often subject to capricious external pressures
demanding what the producer considers an "optimal pricing of information."
While the international trade of copyrighted goods (as a part of the overall trade.
in intellectual merchandise) the predominant tone is sounded given by the
concerns of GA'IT, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade252 •

GA'IT is the flip side of the attempt to control or at least regulate

international efforts253 following the idea that "trade continues to serve a

252

•

See supra note no. 8.

The Original U.S. proposals for an international trade organization "did not include more
than passing reference to economic development." The U.S. position was that the "lessdeveloped countries could best develop by participating fully in a multilateral nondiscriminatory
system with the lowest possible levels of tariffs and no quantitative restrictions." Dam, The
GATT, 225. But after the 1955 Review Session, Article XVIII--the principal provision dealing
with the problems of "less-developed" countries--emphasized that those countries "should be
freer than developed countries to impose quantitative and other restrictions in order to proteCt
infant industries and to combat payment imbalances." id, 227. (The text of this article, id., 418-

26)
253

The GATI' negotiations, even if obscured at the last Round by the events in the Soviet
Union and the Persian Gulf (and for many that represents the "fact" that crisis and war are the
dominant factors in international relations, "while trade and economic relations are recessive
elements"), are probably even more a significant because they represent a peaceful, potentially
more successful bid to control the world. G. R. Winham, "The Evolution of International Trade
Agreements," Toronto UP, 1992, 3 [hereinafter Winham, The Evolution of International Trade].
•
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communication function." GAIT is similarly pursuing copyrighted goods as
just another element of the world commerce. For instance, the draft of Uruguay
Round agreements254 promotes the underlying notion that domestic copyright
statutes can be simply another form of government trade regulation255 • The
Uruguay Round presented, for the first time in GAIT's history, on its ideas
protection agenda256 under "new issues"- Trade-related Intellectual Property
(TR1Ps) 257 • TRIPs has since been included in GAIT at the so-called
"successful" conclusion of the Uruguay Round at the end of 1993.

About the real US expectations concerning GATT, see P. Behr, "Pre-Summit Trade Deal
Seen Unlikely; Bentsen Views Accord on Tariffs as Elusive" The Washington Post, July 2,
1993: "A successful GATT negotiations" would stimulate "an expansion of trade that could add
$5 trillion to worldwide economic output in the next 10 years," Treasury estimates," and the US
share would be $1 trillion. (The negotiations had failed for 6 years because of the endless debate
between the EEC and the USA over farm subsidies.)
254

• See "Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations," GATT doc. MTN,TNC/W/35 of 26 november 1990, which was updated in a
document bearing the same title and tabled by the GATI' director-general on 20 December 1991.
Winham, The Evolution of International Trade, 71.

255

"The idea that over 400 pages of government-sponsored trade rules would be a move
toward freer trade would have simply astounded Adam Smith," id.
256

•

See M. Jussawalla, "The Economics of Intellectual Property in a World without
Frontiers. A Study of Computer Software" Greenwood Press, NY, 58 1992.
•

m. This issue was the 13th from the originally 15 issues enumerated in the Punta del Este
ministerial declaration. "The Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade
Negotiation," J. M. Finger, and A. Olechowski (eds.), World Bank, Washington, 1987,
appendix 3.
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What is revealing about the complex function of copyright on the
international level is the start and evolution.of TRIPs. First of all, it was the
developed countries which started the debate. From their perspective inadequate
protection of intellectual property was a serious non-tariff barrier to trade. They
thus framed the issue as one of counterfeit goods. For their part, the developing
countries put into question intellectual property rights (thus "copy-rights"),
saying that "developed countries could use them to maintain a competitive edge
relative to countries lacking sophisticated technological infrastructure. "258
Boldly, and without apparent embarassement, what the United States
proposed was to demand more from the developing countries, including them in
a new international code of intellectual property259, opening their domestic
258

Winh!lfil, The Evolution of International Trade, 81. India and Brazil also viewed
harmonical international protection of intellectual property as a barrier to trade. id.
•

259

• Copyright, together with otJi,er intellectual property and technolpgy issues have not
traditionally been seen as trade "(or even 'trade-related') issues." The United States and others
think, however, that if they could be treated as a trade, rather than a copyright violation,
intellectual pi:operty disputes could be resolved by "the enforcement of the GATT, rather than
the apparently ineffectual one of local courts" or alternatively the traditional international
agency, WIPO, could be used. S. Page, M. Davenport, and A. Hewitt, "The GATI Uruguay
Round: Effects and Developing Countries," Overseas Development Institute, London, 1992, 47
[hereinafter Page, The GATT].

See also "GATI or WIPO? New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual
Property", (F. K. Beier, and G. Schricker, eds.), 1990; "Intellectual Property Rights: Global
Consensus, Global Conflict?" (R. M. Gladbaw, T. J. Richards, eds.),1988; "Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (pts. 1 & 2), 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 223, 689, (1989),
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market to American intellectual products260 • At the same time they did not plan
to change American copyright law, which indicates that at the international level
the negotiations and copyright relations are one sided261 • This policy was
imperiously assembled in one overall package which "all participants are
expected to accept," changing the Uruguay Round approach from a bargained
gradualist negotiation into an "all or nothing" edict. 262
Since the developed countries are the global supplier of technology and
information and the developing countries are net importers, aside from GAIT,
other unilateral actions (mostly bilateral treaties between the First and Third

reprinted in "Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property" (L. Brown, & E. Szweda, eds.),
1990; P. E. Geller, "Can the GAIT Incorporate Bene Whole?" 4 World lntell. Prop. Rep. 193
(1990).
260

• The developing countries occupy a different economic position. The partly developed
ones, such as Brazil and India, opposed including intellectual trade-related issues in the Round,
because access the technology was very important to them and the trade interests relatively
small. But yet, they are the most desired market, and it is expected that India will give way on
pharmaceuticals, and the Brasilia to computers, without regard to the least developed countries.
The latter are too small to matter for lost profits, but, nevertheless they have to support "all-ornothing" politics.
And in all this, the textiles and agriculture are important enough for the South-Asian and
Latin American countries, so that it is expected they too will accept strategy, thus imposing it
upon all developing countries. Page, The Uruguay Round, 48-9.
261

The reaction of U.S. trade negotiators "can be summed up as follows: 'we didn'tgetinto
the intellectual property negotiation to change our own laws' (comment from personal
interview)." Winham, The Evolution of International Trade, 93.
262

•

•

Winham, The Evolution of International Trade, 85-6.
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World nations), described by some Western experts263 as a potential source of
fragmenting or targeting the world trade264 , have achieved much the same
result, in the sense of .procuring desired legislative changes in developing
countries265 • Their main trait seems to be a lack of commercial justification.
While the US, Western Europe and Japan possess most of the world computer
population266 , the only effect of an international success at harmonizing
263

The authors of The European Community, 2d part, are: D. Greenaway, (University of
Nottingham), P. A. Messerlin, (Institut d 'etudes politiques de Paris) and K. Maskus, (University
of Colorado).
•

264

What cultural exchange means for EC countries with Central and Eastern--including
former Soviet Union- European partners is a very delicate issue. Sometimes it seems, that
before all else, the EEC is concerned with "economic culture", that is with the creation of legal
frameworks and market institutions which will ensure "equal opportunities for any company or
individual to enter the market and to start business activity in a market economy." Y. Kuzminov,
"Problems of Economics Culture Change" 49 European Economy, 217, 223 (1993).
On an attempt to integrate the former "socialist" countries in research-programs, see E.
G. Sanchez, "Cooperation scientifique et technique avec les pays de l'Europe Centrale et de l'Est
dans le cadre COST", 353, Revue du Marche Commun et de l'Union Europeenne, 877 (1991);
E. Devoue, "L'Europe et la regionalisation des pays en voie de developpement: le cas de la
cooperation regionale en recherche-developpement" 371 id., 718 (1993). On the poor results of
technological and cultural cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe, when both partners
know how vital this cooperation is for a decent future of the latter, see K. Szymkiewicz, "Le
difficile 'retour a l'Europe' des pays de l'Est" 369 id., 527 (1993).
265

Legislative changes have been enacted since 1986 or are under consideration in Brazil,
Mexico, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Turkey, and Poland, among other
countries. See the EEC rapport, The European Community.
•

266

• The US controls about 90% of the computer sector of the international market and its
manufacturers supply almost 100% of home market. IBM alone supplies about 65% of the US
market. The major data banks are located in this same part of the world: Lockheed, which in
1977 possessed 100 of the 500 publicly available data bases in the world, and SDC (System
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national regimes into so-called "coherent international regulations" using as a
model the domestic statutes of industrialized countries, will be to increase Third
World dependence upon developed countries267.
"Information is inseparable from its organization and
form of storage. The knowledge will end up by
modelling itself-as it always has done--on the stocks of
information. The location of data banks constitutes an
imperative of sovereignty. "268
Development Corporation) which accounts for 75 % of the European market and 60% of the US
market. J. Beck~, "Information Technology and a New Informational Order" Transnational Data
Reporting Service--Studentlitteratur, Amsterdam, 1985, 57-60.
267

While these countries desire self-reliance and independence, and to protect themselves
against further domination of their economic, social, cultural and political life, they also need
to participate in the international exchange of views, knowledge, and commodities.
•

In the context of digitaliz.ation of information, when TDF (transborder Data Flows)
become the main source of information for news, education, scientific, and political decisions,
this desire is unlikely to be achieved. Becker, Information Technology, 65, 67.
At the same time the reader must remember, there are experts and others who really
believe that the "economic embargo" (what is not economic?) was "the principal cause of the
historic changes in the Soviet and communist world." And self- reliance in itself might not be
desirable. D. E. McDaniel, "United States Technology Export Control. An Assessment"
PRAEGER, Westport, 1993, 199.
268

S. Nora, "Report" in Advertising World, October, 1978, 20 cited in Becker, Information
Technology, 67. S. Nora, and A. Mine, "L'Informatisation de la societe," La Documentation
Fran~se, Paris, 1978, 72, cited in C. J. Hamelink, "Transnational Data Flows in the
Information Age" Studentlitteratur, Amsterdam, 1984, 89.
•
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Certainly GAIT functions in part as just another tool to achieve global
supremacy. The U.S.,in the Uruguay Round, simply initiated a policy also
supported by firms in also the European Community and Japan engaged in
significant product and technology innovations and artistic creation. Their desire
for "strong and non-discriminatory minimum standards" for protecting
'

'

copyrighted products within GAIT is partially true. It might represent just a
transparent mechanism, that is, one in which power relationships and not
expressly drawn--for a world dominated by multinational firms. But these
interests are not above national or at least regional interests.
This truly irresistible force of the relationship between national copyright
and its national subjects, and international copyright and dominated international
trade makes somewhat ridiculous debate against extension of a commercial
monopoly in the author's interest, both in time--duration of copyright-- and
subject matter, as long as its basis of legitimacy--incentives for authors--is no
longer true. If the ideology of authorship and incentives has been captured, as
seems to be true, by institutional-national, international and multinational-interests, which seem to profit so directly and naturally by that ideology, any
hope or attempt to dismantle it at this point is probably naive.
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